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Global climate change due to increased levels of atmospheric
greenhouse gases caused by human activity has the potential to threaten
life on earth. International cooperation is required to effectively address
this threat; however the climate crisis represents a classic collective
action problem in response to overexploitation of a global commons.
This article explains the global climate change issue, traces efforts to
confront it, and argues that inherent difficulties plague collective
responses to global commons problems. It pinpoints individual reasons
for collective action failures, examines background economic and
scientific problems, and analyzes how group factors such as strategy and
coalition building affect cooperation. Finally, the article overviews how
ambiguous international environmental law principles may further hinder
global solutions to the climate crisis and suggests a series of best
practices for future negotiations.
* B.A. (Providence College), J.D. (Notre Dame Law School), M.P.A (Fairleigh
Dickenson Univ.), LL.M. (The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center & School, U.S.
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published numerous articles on environmental, Constitutional, and military law, in
addition to authoring numerous legal opinions. The author would like to thank Professors
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I. INTRODUCTION
Climate change has far-reaching impacts on the human
environment: on ocean currents, agriculture, animal and plant extinction
rates, and the future of humans on Earth.1 Over the past twenty-five
years, nations have identified, researched, and attempted to respond to
the international environmental problem of climate change.2 Climate
change occurs from sunlight warming the Earth's surface and is
exacerbated by the release of a group of gases-collectively known as
greenhouse gases (GHG)-into the atmosphere. Typical GHGs include:
carbon dioxide, methane, chlorofluorocarbons, nitrous oxide,
perfluorocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons, and sulphur hexafluoride. The
release of GHG emissions has resulted in an intensified natural
greenhouse effect, and may be causing rising sea levels, severe
windstorms, and changing rainfall patterns.3
Scientists believe that human activities including fossil fuel
combustion, deforestation resulting from agricultural burning and
logging forests,4 land use or cover changes, 5 and industrial use of
artificial chemicals (e.g., halocarbons) are responsible for releasing
1. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), IPCC SECOND
ASSESSMENT, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: A REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE 27-36 (1995), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/climate-changes-
1995/ipcc-2nd-assessment/2nd-assessment-en.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2008) [hereinafter
IPCC SECOND ASSESSMENT].
2. The IPCC defines climate change as any long-term variation in climate whether
due to natural variability or as a result of human activity. The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, however, defines it as an unnatural change, resulting
only from human activity. Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Glossary Overview,
http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-basics/fulglossary/ (follow links to
alphabetically listed terms) (last visited Apr. 11, 2008). Global warming, in contrast, is a
"progressive gradual rise of the Earth's average surface temperature thought to be caused
in part by increased concentrations of [greenhouse gas emissions] in the atmosphere." Id.
3. J.F. RISCHARD, HIGH NOON: TWENTY GLOBAL PROBLEMS, TWENTY YEARS TO
SOLVE THEM 70 (2002).
4. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, CLIMATE CHANGE:
STATE OF KNOWLEDGE 3 (1997). Emission of carbon dioxide results from the burning of
fossil fuels (e.g., oil, gas, and coal) and deforestation. RISCHARD, supra note 3.
5. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), Summary for
Policymakers, in IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON THE REGIONAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE:
AN ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY (R.T. Watson et al. eds., 1997), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sres/regional/index.htm. See also Barton H. Thompson,
Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241,
242 (2000). For example, cattle and rice farming, along with landfill waste, are the main
source of methane. RISCHARD, supra note 3.
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significant GHG emissions into the atmosphere. 6 Increased GHG
emissions enhance the natural greenhouse effect by trapping solar heat
and slowing down re-radiation into space, causing an insulating effect.7
Whereas the natural greenhouse effect maintains the Earth's average
temperature at approximately sixty degrees Fahrenheit, the atmospheric
build up of GHGs traps heat and causes the Earth to warm dramatically.8
The international response to the threat of global climate change has
been ineffective to date. The challenge of mobilizing the global
community to reduce GHG emissions represents a classic tragedy of the
commons, a problem that occurs when a shared or "open access"
resource (e.g., the atmosphere) is readily and freely available for
unsustainable exploitation. 9 A concerted global response, also known as
collective action, offers the opportunity to create incentives for
sustainable use. This article argues that in order to address ongoing
atmospheric degradation, sovereign states must overcome their divergent
interests in order to cooperate and act collectively.'0 Furthermore, it
argues that the collective action to date has failed in a number of ways.
Part II of this article provides an historical overview of climate
change and describes how nations have attempted to deal with this trans-
boundary issue. Part III argues that inherent difficulties exist in taking
collective action to address a global commons problem. Part IV suggests
that certain international environmental law principles actually hinder
global collective action. Finally, Part V offers several solutions to
encourage effective collective action.
6. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Climate Change Information
Sheet 1: An Introduction to Climate Change, available at
http://unfccc.int/essentialbackground/
background publicationshtmlpdf/climate change information kit/items/60.php.
7. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, supra note 4, at 2.
8. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), GLOBAL WARMING:
EMISSION REDUCTIONS POSSIBLE AS SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTIES ARE RESOLVED 2,
GAO/RCED-90-58 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 GAO REPORT].
9. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE, Dec. 1968, at 1243,
available at
http://www.garretthardinsociety.org/articles/art-tragedy_of thecommons.html.
10. Thompson, supra note 5.
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF CLIMATE CHANGE
A. Where We Have Been: An Historical Review of Climate Change
I am far from satisfied with the results of the negotiations thus far,
the goal of which is exceedingly ambitious for it is no less than to
positively control man's impact on the Earth's climate. The dynamics
of climate, the impact of man's influence on it, its timeframes and
thresholds and danger points are still far from perfectly understood
... Having said that ... I accept the proposition that the potential
for serious climate disruption is real and that the global community
must respond at an appropriate pace. 
1
'
-Senator Robert Byrd, 1998
As scientists uncover stronger evidence about the effects of global
warming, the world increasingly recognizes the existence and magnitude
of the global threat of climate change. The Kyoto Protocol (Protocol)12
has been the most notable attempt to effectuate collective action and it
served to, "established emissions ceilings on 6 specified GHGs for 38
countries, with the 15 members of the European Union (EU) treated as a
single unit, to be reached on average in the five-year accounting period
2008-2012."'13 The Protocol, an international agreement of 150 nations,
has fallen short in a variety of ways, primarily because it fails to achieve
true collective action. As Table 1 below reflects, the world has made
some progress towards addressing climate change.
11. 144 CONG. REC. S194, S195 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1998) (statement of Sen. Robert
Byrd (D-W. Va.) regarding the December 1997 negotiations at the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change's (UJNFCCC), Third Conference of the
Parties (COP) in Kyoto, Japan and the resulting collective agreement, the Kyoto
Protocol).
12. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, I.L.M. 22 (entered in to force Nov. 2005) [hereinafter Kyoto
Protocol].
13. Richard N. Cooper, The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept, 31 ENVTL. L. REP.
(ENvTL. L. INST.) 11484, 11484 (2001).
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Table 1. Global Climate Change Responses
Year Global Response
1979 ISSUE FIRST IDENTIFIED (First World Climate Conference)
1988 U.N. RESOLUTION TO PROTECT THE CLIMATE (climate change
recognized and response framework sought)
1989 HAGUE DECLARATION ON THE ENVIRONMENT (affirms
climate change requires a global solution)
1990 U.N. 2ND CLIMATE PROTECTION RESOLUTION
(Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to form
framework convention)
1992 U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
(UNFCCC)
(establishing collective goals addressing climate change)
1995- CONFERENCES OF THE PARTIES (COP)
Present (180 signatories to the UNFCCC meet annually)
1995 COP 1 -BERLIN MANDATE (non-binding commitments with
time frames to reduce emissions)
1997 KYOTO PROTOCOL (entered into force in 2005, sets limits for
8 GHG emissions for 38 countries)
World leaders and scientists first recognized climate change as a
global, transboundary environmental issue in 1979 at the World
Meteorological Organization's (WMO) First World Climate
Conference. 14 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, policymakers, scientists,
and environmentalists met to address scientific and policy issues of
climate change and the need for world-wide action. 15 In 1989, the United
14. World Meteorological Organization, World Climate Programme (2005),
http://www.wmo.ch/pages/ prog/wcp/index en.html (follow links to programmes) (last
visited Apr. 28, 2008) (Essentially a scientific conference, scientists from a myriad of
disciplines attended this World Climate Conference, meeting in plenary sessions as well
as working groups studying climate data, identifying climate topics, reviewing impact
studies, and examining research regarding climate variability and change.); UNITED
NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (UNFCCC), CLIMATE CHANGE
INFORMATION KIT: INFORMATION SHEET 17, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/ essential-background! backgroundpublications-htmlpdf/
climate change information kit/items/300.php (last visited Apr. 12, 2008). This
conference led to the World Climate Programme. Id. [hereinafter INFORMATION SHEET
17].
15. INFORMATION SHEET 17, supra note 14. Specifically, the following conferences
were held: Villach (1985); Toronto (1988); Ottawa (1989); Tata (1989); Hague (1989);
Noordwijk Ministerial (1989); Cairo Compact (1989); Bergen (1990); and the Second
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Nations issued The Hague Declaration on the Environment, 16 which
publicly affirmed the dangers of global atmospheric warming,
deterioration of the ozone layer, and climate change. The report called
for a solution that was "vital, urgent and global."' 7 Most notably, the
Declaration foreshadowed the problem of "equity," stating that most
emissions originated in industrialized nations where "room for change is
the greatest" and "the greatest resources to deal with this problem"
exist.' 8 Global concern began following a more focused path in 1990,
when the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 45/212,
entitled "Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future
Generations of Mankind." The resolution established the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC), which was tasked with
creating a framework convention on climate change, appropriate
commitments, and related instruments. ' 9
At the 1992 Rio "Earth Summit," the INC announced the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and
thereby created a roadmap and collective goals by which to address
climate change. 20 The UNFCCC parties subsequently agreed to stabilize
atmospheric GHG concentrations "to avoid 'dangerous interference' with
the climate system" by controlling methane, nitrous oxide, and, in
World Climate (1990). Id.
16. The United Nations' activities prior to The Hague Declaration added
momentum for action. In particular, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
"Protection of the Global Climate" Resolution, catapulting climate change forward as a
global issue. With this resolution, the world community recognized the climate change
problem and sought a framework for response. G.A. Res. 43/53 U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/53
(Dec. 6, 1988), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/43/a43r053.htm.
17. The Hague Declaration on the Environment, March 11, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1308,
1309 [hereinafter The Hague Declaration]. As the Declaration notes the 1985 Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 1987 Montreal Protocol
addressed ozone depletion. Id. at 1308. See also Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 451,
466-68 (1993) (discussing other international meetings addressing climate change
including the 1989 Noordwijk Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and
Climate Change resulting in the Noordwijk Declaration, recognizing the North-South
dimension, and the 1990 Berlin Ministerial Conference on Sustainable Development).
18. The Hague Declaration, supra note 17, at 1309. Furthermore, the Declaration
called for "regulatory, supportive and adjustment measures" that would account for "the
participation and potential contribution of countries which have reached different levels
of development." Id.
19. G.A. Res 45/212, U.N, Doc. A/RES/45/212 (Dec. 21, 1990), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/ 45/a45r212.htm.
20. INFORMATION SHEET 17, supra note 14; United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849, 854-55 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
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particular, carbon dioxide emissions. 2' Although the UNFCCC did not
commit the parties to specific GHG emission limits, it did achieve
several notable accomplishments. First, the UNFCCC set a common,
long-term goal to stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations at a level
that would prevent "anthropogenic interference with the climate
system., 2 2 The UNFCCC also established a GHG emissions control
target for industrialized countries to reduce emissions to 1990 levels by
the year 2000.23 Additionally, the UNFCCC set forth principles, albeit
vague, to address inter and intra-generational inequities, the needs of
developing countries, sustainable development, and international
economic concerns.24 Lastly, the UNFCCC established a process to
improve data collection, reduce scientific and economic uncertainties,
encourage national planning, and produce more concrete international
standards. 25
The UNFCCC entered into force as an international treaty in 1994
and has over 180 signatories. 26 After establishing the UNFCCC the INC
dissolved in 1995. Subsequently, the annual Conference of the Parties to
the UNFCCC has become the "ultimate authority" for the Convention.27
A Conference of the Parties has taken place annually since 1995 (COP 1-
12).2 8 The most notable global-scale policy emerged in 1997 from COP-
3, in the form of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol commits
21. Angela Churie et al., Summary of the Eighteenth Sessions of the Subsidiary
Bodies of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 12 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS
BULL. 1, June 16, 2003, available at http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/climate/sb 18.
22. Bodansky, supra note 17, at 455 (quoting UNFCCC, supra note 20, art. 2).
23. Annex I parties are essentially developed countries and countries transiting to
market economies, listed in Annex I to the UNFCCC. See UNFCCC, supra note 20, at
Annex I.
24. UNFCCC, supra note 20, art. 3; see discussion infra Part IV (for details on
sustainable development, intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle).
25. UNFCCC, supra note 20, art. 3.
26. Churie et al., supra note 21.
27. See INFORMATION SHEET 17, supra note 14.
28. The annual meetings take place around the globe. For a list of the previous
sessions and their locations of the Conference of the Parties (COP) see UNFCC, Previous
Sessions, http://unfccc.int/meetings/archive/items/2749.php (last visited Sept. 5, 2008). In
1995, COP-i's Berlin Mandate identified the UNFCCC's non-binding commitments'
inadequacies, reinforced the developed countries as leading the efforts, and established
the goal of setting "quantified limitation and reduction objectives within specified
timeframes, such as 2005, 2010 and 2020, for anthropogenic emissions by sources and
removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol."
UNFCCC, REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES ON ITS FIRST SESSION, HELD AT
BERLIN FROM 28 MARCH TO 7 APRIL 1995, para. 11.2(a), p. 5 (6 June 1995),
FCC/CP/1 995/7/Add. 1, available at
http://unfccc.int/cop4/resource/docs/cop 1/07a01 .pdf.
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developed countries and those transitioning to market economies-
together, Annex I parties29-to reduce their 1990 overall emissions
levels by a minimum of five percent. 30 The Protocol also provides for an
implementation timetable to establish emissions trading opportunities,
cross boundary emissions reductions, and GHG "sink" sequestration.
31
The Protocol requires Annex I parties to establish National GHG
Inventories-including emission and sequestration data-and to verify
annual compliance with emissions limitations.32 To assist Annex I parties
in compliance, the Protocol created three interrelated mechanisms to
reduce emissions. These mechanisms include an emissions trading
system, 33 a credit-sharing system for emission-reducing projects jointly
implemented by Annex I parties,3 4 and a Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) 35 meant to encourage reduction in non-Annex I countries. 36 The
emissions trading system allows industrialized countries to increase their
cap by purchasing other industrialized nations' Kyoto allocations. The
joint implementation mechanism allows industrialized nations to eam
29. UNFCCC, supra note 20, at Annex 1.
30. Churie et al., supra note 2 1; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 12, art. 3. Levels are to
be phased in between 2008 and 2012 with individual country targets varying. For
example, the European Union hopes to achieve an 8% target and Iceland a 10% reduction
target. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 12, at Annex B.
31. Cooper, supra note 13, at 11484. The UNFCCC defines a "sink" as "any
process, activity, or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a
precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere." UNFCCC, supra note 20, art. 1. See
also Alexander Gillespie, Sinks and the Climate Change Regime: The State of Play, 13
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F 279, 286 (2003).
32. See UNFCCC, National Reports,
http://unfccc.int/nationalreports/items/1408.php (last visited Sept. 5, 2008).
33. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 12, art. 17; Churie et al., supra note 21. See also,
Clare Breidenich et al., The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L. 315, 323-24 (1998); Laura B. Campbell & Chad
W. Carpenter, From Kyoto to Buenos Aires: Implementing the Kyoto Protocol on Climate
Change, 21 BNA INT'L ENVT'L REP. 748, 750 (1998).
34. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 12, art. 4, 6; Churie et al., supra note 21. See also,
Breidenich et al., supra note 33, at 323-4.
35. The Clean Development Mechanism is designed to aid developing countries
undertake "activities to prevent climate change while achieving sustainable
development." Campbell & Carpenter, supra note 33, at 749-50.
36. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 12, art. 12; Churie et al., supra note 21. See also,
Breidenich et al., supra note 33, at 325.
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credits by working with other Annex I nations to implement specific
emissions reduction projects. The CDM permits Annex I countries to
earn credits by implementing projects within the boundaries of
developing nations.37
37. DAVID G. VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE STRUGGLE
TO SLOW GLOBAL WARMING 4 (2001). In November 2005, the Kyoto Protocol entered
into force when signatories accounting for 45% of world-wide carbon dioxide emissions
in 1990 ratified the agreement. UNFCCC, Status of Ratification,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto protocol/background/status of ratification/items/2613.php (last
visited Sept. 5, 2008). Since 1997, global attention focused on whether major GHG
emitters, such as the United States and Russia were participating in the commitments of
the Kyoto Protocol. By June 6, 2003, the UNFCCC Secretariat reported 110 nations-not
including the United States and Russia-accounting for 43.9% of industrialized nations'
emissions had ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Ratification by Russia-alone accountable for
17% of the world's greenhouse gas emissions in 1990- "would push that tally over the
55% threshold needed for the treaty to become international law." Eric J. Lyman, Bonn
Meeting Confronts Uncertainty About Russia's Ratification of Kyoto Pact, DAILY ENVTL.
REP., June 13, 2003, A-6. The failure of the United States and Russia to formally ratify
the Protocol was the most problematic for nations supporting the Protocol as well as
others contemplating ratifying it. In 2003, UNFCCC Director Waller-Hunter admitted
that if the United States and Russia "stay[ed] on the sidelines and the [P]rotocol [did] not
enter into force" some countries, most notably Japan, might waiver in their support. Eric
J. Lyman, Russian Fence-Setting Could Speed up Work on Expanding Kyoto Pact, UN.
Official Says, BNA CHEMICAL REG. DAILY, Oct. 1, 2003, available at
http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/CRD.NSF/1 25731 d8816a84d385256297005f336a/2ad33fl 5
cb2f50ad85256db200006073?OpenDocument. Director. Waller-Hunter further suggested
that to make the agreement more attractive to powerful, skeptical remaining nations, the
Kyoto framework could "shift from the current emphasis on binding, overall emission-
reduction targets to a more complicated model tying greenhouse gas emission limits to
economic growth or technology use[.]" Id. (quoting Waller-Hunter). However, in 2004,
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the bill confirming that country's ratification of
the Protocol, despite the warnings of his economic adviser, Andreai Illarionov who
advised that the agreement would hinder Russia's economic growth. Putin Clears Way
for Kyoto Pact, BBC NEWS, Nov. 5, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/
2985669.stm (last visited Sept. 5, 2008). President Putin overcame his long time
hesitancy to commit to the Protocol by agreeing to push Protocol support in exchange for
the European Union's support of Russia's attempt to join the World Trade Organization.
Id. See also China Welcomes Russian Approval of Kyoto Protocol, ENVTL. NEWS
NETWORK, Oct. 29, 2003, http://www.enn.com/topstories/article 256 (last visited Sept.
5, 2008).
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B. Post-Kyoto Obstacles to Progress
The Kyoto Protocol was fatally flawed in fundamental ways. But the
process used to bring nations together to discuss our joint response
to climate change is an important one.... Our country, the United
States is the world's largest emitter of manmade [GHGs]. We
account for almost 20 percent of the world's man-made [GHG]
emissions. We also account for about one-quarter of the world's
economic output. We recognize the responsibility to reduce our
emissions. We also recognize the other part of the story--that the rest
of the world emits 80 percent of all [GHGs]. And many of those
emissions come from developing countries. This is a challenge that
requires a 100 percent effort; ours, and the rest of the world's. We
recognize our responsibility and will meet it-at home, in our
hemisphere, and in the world.... 3
- President George W. Bush, 2001
The failure of the Protocol is often attributed to the unequal
economic burdens it imposes upon signatory countries and its adverse
impacts on national competitiveness. Furthermore, signatory nations
criticize the protocol for its free-rider problem-its omission of major-
emitters from binding GHG reduction targets. Changes in national
leadership, inconsistent domestic policies, and the inability of some
signatories to meet their Protocol commitments also inhibit realization of
the Protocol's goals. Finally, mutual distrust and the threat of leakage
hinder an adequate global response to climate change.39
1. The United States Position
The United States maintains that the Protocol is "fatally flawed"
40
because: 1) the extent of anthropogenic induced climate change is
uncertain, 2) emissions allocation schemes that only bind Annex I
countries have the potential to harm economic competitiveness, and
38. Press Release, The White House, President Bush Discusses Global Climate
Change, June 11, 2001, available at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html [hereinafter President
Bush Discusses Climate Change].
39. Leakage occurs when countries abate emissions causing businesses and
emissions to move to other unregulated countries.
40. In June 2001, President Bush used this language to describe the Kyoto Protocol.
See President Bush Discusses Climate Change, supra note 38.
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3) an effective collective action response requires reciprocal GHG
reduction commitments from developing nations.4'
In May 2001, President Bush asked the National Academy of
Sciences 42 to identify the greatest uncertainties in the science of climate
change and assess "views on whether there are any substantive
differences between the IPCC Reports and the IPCC summaries. 43 After
receiving a final report from the Committee on the Science of Climate
Change in June 2001, the President directed a cabinet-level climate
change working group to develop innovative approaches that stabilize
GHG concentrations, ensure continued economic growth, favor market-
based incentives, and spur technological innovation.44 Furthermore, he
required that these approaches be flexible enough to adjust to new
information or technology and be rooted in global, collective
41. The United States position varied only slightly during the Clinton
Administration. Before the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Conference of the Parties in Kyoto convened in December 1997, during the Clinton
Administration, Senator Charles Hagel (R-NE) paired up with Senator Robert Byrd (D-
WV) to sponsor Senate Resolution 98. This resolution passed the Senate 95-0 in July
1997. See 143 CoNG. REc. S8139, Vote No. 205 (July 25, 1997). Resolution 98 declared
that in Kyoto the United States should not be a signatory to any agreement (regarding the
UNFCCC of 1992) that would: 1) mandate new commitments for Annex I Parties to limit
or reduce GHGs unless such agreement would mandate commitments for developing
country Parties within the same compliance period or 2) seriously harm the U.S.
economy. Moreover, Senate Resolution 98 reflects two concerns--disparate treatment
and national economic costs. Resolution 98 gave President Clinton a preview of the
Senate's response to any request to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2
(granting the President the "Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur."). Nevertheless, Vice
President Gore ceremonially signed the Protocol for the United States in December 1997.
In May 1998, Senator Joe Knollenberg (R-MI) responded by introducing the American
Economy Protection Act, H.R. 3807, 105th Cong. (1998) to "prevent the administration
from implementing [through regulation] this dangerous treaty in the absence of Senate
ratification by requiring that Federal funds cannot be used for rules, regulations, or
programs designed to execute the Kyoto Protocol." 144 CONG. REC. at H3494-03 (daily
ed. May 20, 1998) (statement of Rep. Knollenberg).
42. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, COMMITTEE ON THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY QUESTIONS vii (2001)
[hereinafter ACADEMY ANALYSIS].
43. Id. app. A. (Letter from John M. Bridgeland, Deputy Assistant to the President
for Domestic Policy and Director, Domestic Policy Council & Gary Edson, Deputy
Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs to Dr. Bruce Alberts,
National Academy of Sciences, May 11, 2001) [hereinafter Letter from John M.
Bridgeland].
44. WHITE HOUSE CLIMATE CHANGE INITIAL REPORT 1 (2001), available at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/climatechange.pdf.
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participation.45 President Bush's directive reflects skepticism of the
foundational science used as evidence of anthropogenic climate
change.46 In lieu of participation in what was viewed as a flawed
Protocol and suffering potential economic hardships, the Bush
Administration has adopted a bilateral approach. In pursuing this
strategy, the White House has emphasized changes in national policy and
"partnerships for climate solutions" 47 as the appropriate means of
addressing climate change.48
45. Id.
46. The Bush Administration's skepticism was confirmed when President George
W. Bush announced the Clear Skies and Global Climate Change Initiatives. He remarked
that "[w]e must also act in a serious and responsible way, given the scientific
uncertainties" and the United States will "continue to lead the world in basic climate and
science research to address gaps in our knowledge that are important to decisionmakers."
President Bush's Remarks Announcing the Clear Skies and Global Climate Change
Initiatives in Silver Spring, Maryland, 1 PUB. PAPERS 226 (Feb. 14, 2002) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020214-5.html [hereinafter
President Bush's Clear Skies Remarks].
47. WHITE HOUSE CLIMATE CHANGE INITIAL REPORT, supra note 44, at 31.
48. Specifically, in its Climate Change Initial Report, the Administration points to
the Joint Declaration on sustainable development that the Secretary of State signed on
June 7, 2001 with seven Central American countries. The Report states that "[tihe
Declaration emphasizes 'the need for intensified cooperative efforts to address climate
change,' citing as priority for action: [s]cientific research; [e]stimating and monitoring
greenhouse gases; [i]nvesting in forestry conservation; [e]nhancing energy efficiency;
[p]romoting environmental technologies; [e]nhancing capacity to adapt to climate
change; and [c]ollaborating to better understand regional impacts of climate change."
WHITE HOUSE CLIMATE CHANGE INITIAL REPORT, supra note 44, at 32. As for domestic
policy, in 2002, President Bush announced his Clear Skies and Global Change Initiatives,
observing that, because the climate change problem "presents a different set of
challenges" with complex science, less-certain answers, and less-developed technology, a
flexible approach was needed to "adjust to new information and new technology."
President Bush's Clear Skies Remarks, supra note 46. This is President Bush's
"environmental approach that will clean our skies, bring greater health to our citizens,
and encourage environmentally responsible development in America and around the
world." Id. To clean the "air that Americans breathe," the President called for clean skies
legislation to reach "ambitious air quality goals through a market-based cap-and-trade
approach that rewards innovation, reduces cost, and guarantees results." Id. This flexible
approach entails cutting United States greenhouse gas emissions "relative to the size of
our economy" by 1% over ten years. Id. In October 2003, the U.S. General Accounting
Office (GAO) reviewed the Administration's February 2002 Climate Initiative which
established an 18% reduction of "emissions intensity" by 2012, and found the
Administration's public documents did not support an 18% figure, but rather the already
anticipated 14% reduction estimate. Furthermore, the Initiative lacked specific plans for
interim progress monitoring. Preliminary Observations on the Administration's February
2002 Climate Initiative, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office (GAO) Testimony on Climate
Change before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 108th Cong.,
GAO-04-131 T, at 1, 8 (2003) (Statement of John B. Stephenson, Director, GAO Natural
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2. Failure to Include Major-Emitting Nations
The United States position reflects general international concern
that the Kyoto Protocol is inherently flawed because many major-
emitters-notably China, India, and other developing countries-are
exempt from participating in the Protocol's commitments. As President
Bush noted in 2001, India and China, both major polluters, were exempt
from the Protocol's requirements. 49 GHG emissions represent a
transboundary harm which requires a collective response by all emitters.
However, the sheer number of nations and their conflicting agendas have
the potential to impede any collective action.
The failure of the United States to ratify the Protocol remains
problematic because of its impact on other "fence-sitters"-those who
remain reluctant to join the Protocol (e.g., Australia prior to its 2007
elections). 50 U.S. policy also impacts future decisions and actions of
ratifying nations. For example, Canada might be reluctant to comply for
fear that competitive advantages may accrue to fossil fuel-powered
industries in the unbound United States. 51 Moreover, the Protocol lacks a
meaningful enforcement mechanism and signatories may be distrustful of
other nations:
[Commitments] serve as the glue that helps hold a cooperative regime
together. Before taking potentially costly actions to address climate
change, states need to be confident that others will do their part as
well. International commitments are the means by which countries
bind themselves to one another to take mutual action.
52
In sum, the failure to secure collective buy-in and mutual distrust
significantly undermine the cooperative mentality required for the
success of the Protocol.
Resources and Environment).
49. See President Bush Discusses Climate Change, supra note 38.
50. See Howard Rejects Emissions Targets, BBC.cOM, Aug. 16 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/4797339.stm (last visited Sept. 5, 2008).
51. See Robert Sheppard, Is Meeting Kyoto 'Bad Economic Policy', CBCNEWS.CA,
Apr. 20, 2007,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/realitycheck/sheppard/20070419.html (last visited
Sept. 5, 2008). See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 12 (for information on what obligations a
complying country like Canada must adhere to).
52. Daniel Bodansky, Climate Commitments: Assessing the Options, in BEYOND
KYOTO: ADVANCING THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE 38
(Working Draft), available at
http://www/pewclimate.org/docUploads/Climate%20Commitments.pdf.
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3. Fluctuating National Leadership
To effectively implement an international agreement, the
obligations of each nation must be carried out at the national level. When
obligations are particularly onerous, individual nations will adhere "only
insofar as those nations perceive that positive net benefit[s]... will be
forthcoming., 53 The tendency of successive administrations to alter a
nation's official position and domestic policies further complicates
adherence to international obligations.
Fluctuating U.S. national policy is especially harmful because of the
country's status as the largest GHG emitter. Changing political
administrations and varying policies have prevented the United States
from assuming a leadership role in directing collective action.54 Other
nations have provided varying levels of support and changed domestic
policies. For example, Germany's national leadership recently exempted
the coal industry from the European Union's carbon trading program that
was designed to ensure Protocol compliance. 55 In Canada, the country's
leadership transferred funding away from Protocol implementation
projects in order to support commuter tax credits.56 As these examples
show, consistent national climate change policies may significantly
increase the likelihood of a successful collective response.
4. Inability of Ratifying Nations to Meet Protocol Commitments
International concerns also arise due to the inability of ratifying
nations to meet their commitments. As recently noted, "Canada, Japan,
53. Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National
Governments Address a Global Problem?, UNIV. OF CHI. LEGAL F. 298, 294 (1997)
(citing Geoffrey Heal, Formation of International Environmental Agreements, in TRADE,
INNOVATION, ENV'T 301 (Carlo Carraro ed., 1994) and Carlo Carraro & Domenico
Siniscalco, Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment, 52 J. PUB.
ECON. 309, 323-28 (1993)).
54. For example, on April 21, 1993, President Clinton in introducing The Climate
Change Action Plan stated "Today, I ... announce our nation's commitment to reducing
our emissions of greenhouse gases to their 1990 levels by the year 2000." WHITE HOUSE,
THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1993), available at
http://www.gcrio.org/USCCAP/execsum.html. However, his successor, President George
Bush has not continued that lead.
55. Judy Dempsey, New German Rule Could Increase Greenhouse Gas Emissions,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2006, at C6, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/29/business/worldbusiness/29green.html?ei=5088&en
=4c.





and the European Union-the most enthusiastic advocates of the
[Protocol]-are not on track to meet their commitments. 57 The failure
of signatories to meet their obligations, combined with the lack of
repercussions signals to Annex I and developing nations that the Protocol
is likely to fail.
The lack of accurate emission baselines creates an obstacle in
determining whether participating states are meeting their Protocol
commitments. 8 Some signatories may have an advantage when 1990
baselines are chosen to assess emission rate changes. In nations such as
Russia, where the national economic output has declined since 1990,
GHG emissions may also have decreased. 59 This situation creates "head
room" or "hot air." 60 Conversely, the Protocol's use of 1990 emission
levels as a baseline burdens some countries, like the United States, that
have grown over the past ten years. 61 A further obstacle to the Protocol's
effectiveness may be leakage, a phenomenon which occurs when
businesses move their operations and accompanying emissions to
unregulated countries to avoid the expenses of obtaining emission-
reduction technology. Essentially, even if the Annex I countries reduce
overall emissions, those emissions may resurface elsewhere, as non-
Annex I countries enjoy the economic benefits of leakage.62
57. John Browne, Beyond Kyoto, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 20, July/August 2004.
58. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE., GLOBAL WARMING:
DIFFICULTIES ASSESSING COUNTRIES' PROGRESS STABILIZING EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE
GASES 2 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 GAO REPORT ON DIFFICULTIES ASSESSING COUNTRIES'
STABILIZING EMISSIONS].
59. See SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING 382 (2005).
60. Id.
61. Greg Kahn, Note, The Fate of the Kyoto Protocol Under the Bush
Administration, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 548, 556 (2003).
62. BARRETT, supra note 59, at 383.
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III. CLIMATE CHANGE: A CLASSIC GLOBAL-SCALE
COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM
[States] realize that they cannot solve some transnational or global
environmental problems through individual action, so they agree to
collective action by means of a reciprocal exchange of
promises ....63
- Daniel Bodansky, 1999
The difficulties associated with achieving collective action are
compounded by the fact that-the climate is a readily and freely available
resource subject to exploitation-a phenomenon known as a tragedy of
the commons. 64 Without regulation parties may use the resource as much
as desired, even though such action may result in destruction of the
resource itself. To respond to climate change, equity issues and economic
concerns must be addressed. This section first contemplates the equity
issues that inhibit collective action. It then goes on to address
background factors beyond the economic concerns that impede collective
action. Finally, it describes several foundational problems that parties
must understand and forestall to successfully develop and implement an
adequate global collective response.
A. Global Commons Issues Delay International Collective Action
[Mancur] Olson's [(The Logic of Collective Action (1965))]
examination presents a rational choice basis for collective action...
The success of international collective action depends on the extent to
which the interests of the parties coincide.65
- Joseph R. Bial & Gary D. Libecap, 1999
A tragedy of the commons is a social trap wherein an unregulated,
finite resource is over-consumed by a society, ultimately to the public's
63. Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming
Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 604 (1999).
64. See Hardin, supra note 9; MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL
COLLECTIVE ACTION 11 (2004). See also Thompson, supra note 5, at 242.
65. JOSEPH R. BIAL & GARY D. LIBECAP, GLOBAL WARMING TREATY NEGOTIATION
& COMPLIANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 6, INT'L CENTRE FOR ECON.
RESEARCH (2000) (footnote omitted).
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overall detriment. Garrett Hardin first described this theory in 1968.66
Essentially, where:
[r]uin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his
own best interest in a society which believes in the freedom of the
commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all .... The
challenge is how to legislate temperance using the only means at our
disposal, international law.
67
The atmosphere is the ultimate example of a commons at risk of being
destroyed by global society. In order to combat overuse, nations must
internally regulate at-risk public resources that make up the commons
and all nations must act collectively to ensure such regulation. When
acting collectively to avert a tragedy of the commons, parties face two
core equity issues: free-riding and the inequitable distribution of costs
and benefits of collective action.
Overcoming the tragedy of the commons by collective action
requires a legal framework capable of securing cooperation among all
necessary parties whose interests are not fully aligned. To construct this
legal framework, sovereign states with divergent interests must cooperate
in the allocation of global resources. To secure cooperation, parties must
determine that incentives exist to participate in collective action.
Furthermore, before agreeing to take collective action, the parties must
foresee gains and demonstrable net benefits and perceive an equitable
apportionment of the burden. 68
1. Free-Rider Concerns
Free-riding occurs when some parties bear the costs of an action,
while others, the free-riders, bear no burden, but still enjoy the benefits.
66. See Hardin, supra note 9 (describing how pastures open to all for cattle grazing
(a commons) may result in a tragic overuse of the land (suboptimal resource depletion)
because each "rational herdsman" has an incentive to maximize his individual profits and
will continually add animals to the pasture, despite the destructive impact-no self-
sustaining grasses will remain-that occurs if all herdsmen act similarly. The behavior is
essentially a race to the bottom. With global commons problems, a resource, like the
pasture, is readily and freely available to all, and incentives exist for all parties to obtain
as much of the global resource as they desire, even though collectively this may cause the
resource to be destroyed. Thompson, supra note 5, at 242.
67. Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM.
J. INT'L. L. 259, 282 (1992) (quoting Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
SCIENCE 142 (1968), reprinted in EcoNoMIcS, ECOLOGY, AND ETHICS 100, 104 (H. Daly
ed., 1973)).
68. See Daniel C. Esty & Robert Mendelsohn, Moving from National to
International Environmental Policy, 31 POL'Y Sci. 225, 225 (1998).
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Generally, nations participating in global climate change negotiations are
driven by "economic self-interest and the search for strategic advantage
in an international economy in which trade and capital mobility play an
increasingly important role."69 If a nation can accrue benefits from a
particular course of action without sharing in the burdens, a self-
interested nation will naturally pursue this course of action. For example,
China ratified the Kyoto Protocol, but as a developing, non-Annex I
country has no formal obligations to act to reduce emissions. This is
particularly disconcerting given that China is the world's biggest coal
producer and second largest world-wide carbon dioxide emitter. Despite
signing the Protocol, China continues to maintain its current energy use
practices; the country plans to establish 562 new coal-fired power
stations.70 Without formal obligations, China bears no costs under the
Protocol, but receives benefits in the form of a cleaner atmosphere since
others are required to reduce their emissions.
Such conduct may cause those who do bear the costs to refrain from
participating collectively because of the perceived unfairness of such a
situation. Parties are unlikely to join in collective action unless they are
assured that others will be similarly bound or believe that failing to do so
would result in excessive costs to themselves. 71 For example, one of the
reasons the United States has not ratified the Protocol is because of the
lack of obligations imposed on developing nations that are large emitters
of carbon dioxide. President Bush pointed out the potential for free-
riding in China and India when he stated:
The world's second-largest emitter of [GHGs] is China. Yet, China
was entirely exempted from the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol.
India... among the top emitters ... was also exempt .... These and
other developing countries that are experiencing rapid growth face
challenges in reducing their emissions without harming their
economies.
72
2. Inequitably Allocated Costs and Benefits
Collective action may also be inhibited because participants or
potential participants believe the costs and benefits of collective action
69. Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation & International
Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2041 (1993).
70. Antoaneta Bezlova, Environment: China Sends Smoke Signals on Kyoto
Protocol, INTER PRESS SERVICE NEws AGENCY, Jan. 20, 2006, available at
http://ipsnews.net/print.asp?idnews=31842.
71. ROBERT W. HAHN, THE ECONOMICS & POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 31 (1998).
72. President Bush Discusses Climate Change, supra note 38.
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will be allocated inequitably. This circumstance may arise where a large
emitter reduces its emissions and incurs huge costs to the benefit of all
other nations that will enjoy cleaner air. Reducing countries may rightly
perceive that collective action results in inequitable or unfairly
distributed benefits. Parties often choose not to participate in collective
actions if they perceive themselves unduly burdened. This result may be
mitigated by the provision of individual feedback from other nations
regarding the effects and benefits of their actions. When solving a
tragedy of the commons problem, "resource users are more likely to
restrict their consumption when they receive prompt feedback on the
impact of their extractions, when their behavior is visible to others, when
they can communicate with their fellow resource users and when the
users share a group identity., 73 Thus, clear feedback can serve as an
incentive to parties to participate even where benefits accrue inequitably.
B. Background Factors
Certain social conditions known as background factors influence the
decisions of individual nations to participate in collective action. These
factors include uncertainty and complexity of the underlying climate
change science, economics, and the impact of technology. Proper
understanding and manipulation of these factors has the potential to
create a negotiating environment that is conducive to global collective
action on climate change threats.
1. Science
Climate change science involves the evaluation of interactions of
air, land, water, sunlight, ecosystems, and atmospheric gases. Such
evaluation requires complex data collection methods and computer
climate models that are very sophisticated and difficult to explain. Due to
this complexity, modeling results, underlying data, and climate change
theories cannot be easily conveyed for the general public's
understanding. Consequently, the public may fail to fully realize the
urgency of the climate threat. Until examples of climate change impacts
are obvious and commonplace, it is unlikely that the public, absent
governmental education or intervention, will act as necessary to
effectuate change. Further, even if the public were able to understand the
issue on a global level, it is difficult for governments to predict or
explain to their citizens any particular impacts their nation is likely to
face. In sum, these difficulties frustrate the public's ability to understand
73. Thompson, supra note 5, at 242-43.
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and a government's ability to explain the climate change problem. These
obstacles could ultimately hinder a nation's public support of global
collective action and the political will of emitting countries.
a. Complexity
The science of climate change relies on many complex factors. As
commentators have noted, agreement on science remains an essential
factor in the collective action debate.74 As discussed supra, a multitude
of climate change phenomena are attributed to an intensified, global
"greenhouse effect., 75 The greenhouse effect occurs when carbon
dioxide and other trace gases, like methane 76 or nitrous oxide, react with
water vapor to trap solar rays and prevent normal reflection or re-
radiation into space.77 Evidence of the greenhouse effect is seen in the
form of retreating glaciers, fracturing ice shelves, rising sea levels, and
melting permafrost. 78 The timing, distribution, and impacts of climate
change depend on a myriad of complex, correlated environmental
interactions. Temperature changes have a great effect on other climate
determinants. For example, increased temperatures usually increase the
amount of water vapor carried in the air, but the magnitude of this effect
is difficult to quantify, because it varies with other factors such as
atmospheric pressure. One measured impact of increased water vapor is
that it often creates more re-radiation, which essentially augments the
greenhouse effect. Cloud-cover also influences the interaction of air,
water, land, atmospheric gases, and sunlight. These variables, in turn,
impact the amount of cloud cover, sunlight, ocean currents and
vegetation feedback79 . In sum, all of these variables are impacted by
complex interdependencies.
74. ANDREW E. DESSLER & EDWARD A. PARSON, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: A GUIDE TO THE DEBATE 16-17 (2006) (science, policy
options, and political positioning are regarded as the three major factors surrounding the
collective action debate).
75. RISCHARD, supra note 3, at 70.
76. Id.
77. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, supra note 4, at 2.
78. Daniel Glick, The Big Thaw, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC: GLOBAL WARNING:
BULLETINS FROM A WARMER WORLD, Sept. 2004, at 12. See also Pew Center on Global
Climate Change, Answers to Key Questions Raised by M. Crichton in State of Fear,
http://www.pewclimate.org/state of fear.cfm?printVersion=l (last visited Sept. 15,
2008) (responding to issues raised by MICHAEL CRICHTON, STATE OF FEAR (Harper
Collins 2004) [hereinafter STATE OF FEAR].
79. Christine Moran Sinclair, Global Warming or Not: The Global Climate is




Along with complexity, the inherent uncertainty of existing
scientific data contributes to parties' skepticism about the actual impacts
of climate change. There are three central aspects to the uncertainty
issue: the measurement problem, the self-healing capability of the Earth,
and the actual impact of human activity on climate change.
First, the measurement problem arises from the large number of
climate variables necessary for accurate climate modeling. Small errors
in measuring or assessing any one of the variables could result in
incorrect climate theory conclusions. In addition to measurement
problems, debate surrounds the question of whether nature will correct
the climate change process on its own. Many scientists emphasize that
natural processes exist to stabilize or counter the potential impacts of
GHGs on the Earth's atmosphere without intervening human action. Not
all believers in the Earth's ability to eventually self-heal promote a
hands-off approach. Rather, some advocate enhancing or augmenting the
Earth's natural, known GHG mitigation capabilities. For example,
humans have the ability to create or expand natural "carbon sinks"-
processes, activities, or mechanisms which remove GHGs from the
80 81atmosphere8° and trap carbon and other GHGs in permanent reservoirs.
Despite disagreement within the scientific community on the role of
human GHG emission and its impact on climate change, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) conclusively
determined that human activities such as fossil fuel burning, industrial
emissions, agricultural activities, and deforestation result in significant
GHG emissions.82 The IPCC further found that these emissions
contribute to climate change and if not addressed, will increase the risk
of rising sea levels and flooding, increase the average global temperature,
damage ecosystem stability, adversely impact human health, and cause
food shortages because of changed precipitation patterns.
83
In 2001 the Bush Administration expressed doubt about the IPCC
findings and requested the National Academy of Sciences to identify "the
greatest certainties and uncertainties" of climate change science and to
80. See UNFCCC, supra note 20, art. 1. See also Gillespie, supra note 31, at 279.
81. 1996 GAO REPORT ON DIFFICULTIES ASSESSING COUNTRIES' STABILIZING
EMISSIONS, supra note 58, at 3.
82. IPCC SECOND ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 25-41. Other potential future
impacts may include water shortages in some regions, decrease in agriculture production
in some areas, and mortalities due to insect and/or water-borne diseases. RISCHARD, supra
note 3, at 72-73. Increased global temperature may also result in severe weather events.
Glick, supra note 78, at 22.
83. IPCC SECOND ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 25-41.
20081
Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y
assess the IPCC's reports8 4 Although the Academy's study did not
resolve the underlying debate on the import of uncertainty in climate
change science, it did find that GHG emissions "are accumulating in
Earth's atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing surface air
temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise." 85 However, the
report also noted that some temperature change may reflect natural
variability and stated that global climate change impacts depend
primarily on the magnitude and rate of the Earth's warming.
86
Political entities have reacted differently to the inherent scientific
uncertainty and the IPCC findings. The combination of complex science
and unperceived impacts has also led individuals citizen to believe that
the threat of climate change as, at best, uncertain. This belief is
compounded by the fact that climate change parties and government
decision-makers continue to question the impacts of the threat and the
implications of inaction.
Hesitation to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the Bush
Administration's continued doubt about human causation of climate
change exemplify a negative reaction to this uncertainty. Perceptions of
uncertainty raise concerns regarding hypotheses about the timing, rate,
distribution, and magnitude of climate change impacts. The Bush
Administration, for instance, has stressed the fact that "we do not know
how much effect natural fluctuations in climate may have had on
warming" and "[w]e do not know how much our climate could, or will
change in the future" or "how fast change will occur, or even how some
of our actions could impact it.'
87
c. Impacts - Timing, Regularity, Magnitude
In addition to the uncertainty associated with climate change
science, there are also many uncertainties regarding the magnitude, rate,
and timing of climate change impacts. 88 Parties responding to the climate
84. Letter from John M. Bridgeland, supra note 43.
85. ACADEMY ANALYSIS, supra note 42, at 1. Furthermore, the National Academy
of Sciences reported results of this global change in temperature will include sea level
rises, rainfall rate increases, and "increased susceptibility of semi-arid regions to
drought." Id.
86. Id.
87. See President Bush Discusses Climate Change, supra note 38.
88. Even some basic scientific observations regarding human activities leading to
global climate change are subject to criticism. In November of 2004, the Pew Center on
Global Climate Change and the Arctic Council published reports that concluded global
warming was occurring in part because of human activity. CAMILLE PARMESAN &
HECTOR GALBRAITH, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, OBSERVED IMPACTS OF




change collective action problem are faced with scientific complexities
and uncertainties concerning the extent to which human activities
exacerbate the greenhouse effect and in turn cause climate change. 89
The uncertainty regarding the extent of the impact of climate change
is also exacerbated by natural phenomena. Questions surround how air,
land, and water interact with GHGs, other atmospheric gases, various
ecosystems, and the oceans. The Earth's inherent adaptability to global
warming and self-healing capabilities are poorly understood. 9° For
example, increased atmospheric water vapor levels and evaporation rates
often accompany increased atmospheric temperatures. Assuming
increased vapor does not act as an additional GHG, but instead forms
clouds that reflect sunlight, a cooling effect could occur. 91 The impacts
of ocean current and vegetation feedback on climate change also remain
unresolved, although evidence suggests that ocean currents may delay
global warming by distributing atmospheric heat.92 Certain clouds also
impact the timing and magnitude of climate change by cooling the
Earth's surface.
Without accurate predictions of what clouds will be prevalent with a
GHG build up, data for accurate climate models remains incomplete.9 3
Given the uncertainty of the extent of climate change impact, the threat is
not frightening enough to compel action. For example, reports assert that
ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT, IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC
CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT (2004), available at http://www.acia.uaf.edu. Both reports
asserted global warming is "a real phenomenon transforming sensitive parts of the
globe." Matt Crenson, 2 Reports: Global Warming Real, Already Altering Climate,
CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, at 32, available at
http://www.suntimes.com/output/elect/cst-nws-warml4.html. Despite these reports, some
critics, such as Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), while agreeing that global climate
change is a problem, do "not accept the conclusion the scientists reached: that the driving
force behind warming is people burning coal, oil and natural gas." Alaska Senator
Disagrees with Climate Study's Conclusion, USA TODAY, Nov. 17, 2004, available at
http://www.climateark.org/shared/reader/welcome.aspx?linkid=36557. Senator John
McCain (R-Arizona) opposes this cynicism and argues that "a mountain of scientific
evidence points to the burning of fossil fuels and that immediate action [is] needed to
curb greenhouse gas emissions." Id.
89. 1996 GAO REPORT ON DIFFICULTIES ASSESSING COUNTRIES' STABILIZING
EMISSIONS, supra note 58, at 2 (reporting that the status of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change's goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions could "not be
fully assessed" due to incomplete, unreliable, and inconsistent emissions data).
90. Sinclair, supra note 79, at 557.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. John R. Christy, The Global Warming Fiasco, in GLOBAL WARMING AND OTHER
ECO-MYTHS: How THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT USES FALSE SCIENCE TO SCARE US
TO DEATH 12-13 (Ronald Bailey ed., 2002).
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the "Earth's climate has warmed by about [one] degree since 1900. In the
Arctic, where the warming effects of carbon dioxide are amplified, most
regions have experienced a rise of [four] to [seven] degrees in the last 50
years." 94 Those areas that have not experienced such drastic increases in
temperature are less likely to perceive a significant threat, and
consequently, will be less likely to take collective action.
Inconsistencies in computer modeling predictions add to the climate
change science puzzle. Computerized, general circulation models
provide scientists with the capability to analyze possible future climate
change. 95  However, different models reflect inconsistent results
regarding regional climate changes and timeframes for changes. 96 As the
National Academy of Sciences points out, extensive uncertainty is
inherent in model predictions and requires "major advances in
understanding and modeling of both (1) the factors that determine
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs and aerosols, and (2) the so-called
'feedbacks' that determine the sensitivity of the climate system to a
prescribed increase in [GHGs]. 97
The inconsistent predictions resulting from diverse computer
models is exacerbated that by the fact that many agencies involved in
climate change use different computer models. For example, the U.S.
Government Accounting Office reported that seven federal agencies
funded or operated such divergent models. 98 Those that oppose climate
change action point to the differences in these models to raise doubts
regarding climate change predictions, thereby undermining efforts to
engage in collective action.99
The use of divergent computer models by so many federal agencies,
and the ensuing inconsistent predictions, also leaves room for
94. Crenson, 2 Reports: Global Warming Real, Already Altering Climate, supra
note 88.
95. 1990 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 2.
96. Id. at 4. As GAO points out the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration model predicted that the southeastern United States would experience
abnormally drier summers, while the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
using its model predicted the opposite. Id.
97. ACADEMY ANALYSIS, supra note 42, at 1.
98. These agencies include: Department of Energy, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Science
Foundation, U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency, and
U.S. Geological Survey. 1990 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 2.
99. See STATE OF FEAR, supra note 78 (responding to issues, including model
variation of uncertainty, raised by Michael Crichton's book STATE OF FEAR. However,
various model validation, comparison, and evaluation projects are currently ongoing such




accusations that the government is distributing misinformation to the
public. For instance, Representative Henry A. Waxman, chairman of the
Committee on House Oversight and Government Reform examining the
government's response to climate change, accused the Bush
Administration of "misleading" the public regarding climate change and
"injecting doubt into the science of global warming and minimize[ing]
the potential danger."
100
d. Distribution of Effects and Rewards for Action
A collective response to address climate change is problematic
because it requires many participants to incur immediate costs to prevent
climate change with only a possibility of delayed global rewards. Parties
may delay incurring the costs because, if they receive individual benefits
at all, it will be in the distant future. Some parties even consider benefits
such as energy efficiency gains and the spirit of cooperation to be
insufficient. The uncertain science regarding distribution and timing of
climate change effects causes parties to hesitate to act collectively.
Scientific predictions regarding climate change are unclear as to where,
when, and how climate change will strike.
In some areas, climate change will have positive effects. In such
circumstances, parties who perceive benefits from climate change will be
less likely to participate in collective action..,l1 Russia, for instance,
might enjoy a longer growing season, which likely translates to
economic benefits. In such a circumstance, Russia will be less likely to
participate in collective action. Additionally, while global climate change
may adversely impact United States coastlines, other areas may
experience reduced heating costs or improved farming conditions.' 02
100. Chairman: Bush Officials Misled Public on Global Warming, CNN.cOM,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/Politics/0 1/30/congress.climate.ap/index.html (last visited
Sept. 5, 2008).
101. Scenarios involving the effects and their locations are uncertain. For example,
some predict that many coastlines will migrate miles inland, displacing millions, and
areas such as Siberia and northern Canada may face warmer, wetter climate. Glick, supra
note 78, at 22. Others assert global warming may provide beneficial gains for Americans
by improving health, lowering death rates, easing transportation issues, reducing heating
costs, and satisfying their taste for warm weather. THOMAS GALE MOORE. CLIMATE OF
FEAR: WHY WE SHOULDN'T WORRY ABOUT GLOBAL WARMING 129 (1998). Locations at
higher sea levels could suffer the major costs from mitigating the effects of the increase
in smog caused by rising temperatures. Id. As one critic stated, "From an American point
of view, spending anything to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases is
unwarranted.... Not everyone will agree that warming would be largely beneficial.
Certainly parts of the world and even parts of the United States would be harmed from
climate changes." Id. See also Christy, supra note 93.
102. Id.
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Regardless of the ultimate distribution, the disparity of positive and
negative climate change impacts contribute to the inequity associated
with the costs of collective action.
Similar to the inconsistencies in computer modeling predictions on
the extent of climate change effects, uncertainty regarding distribution of
negative and positive climate change impacts allows policy partisans
who oppose action to manipulate scientific information to support their
respective positions. 103 Nevertheless, parties must commit to accept a
delayed reward for acting collectively based on uncertain science and
possible beneficial impacts.
e. Data Verification and Accuracy
Parties collectively responding to the threat of climate change
encounter difficulties with data management, verification, and
collection-both baseline and subsequent compliance data. Data issues
are especially relevant since the Kyoto Protocol requires National
Greenhouse Gas Inventories (emissions and sink removal data
inventories), which involves methodological detailed data collection and
reporting requirements for emissions and sink removal. 10 4 Emissions
data verification requires establishing an accurate baseline and
subsequently assessing mitigation compliance. This process requires
parties to measure various gases, and accurately, though perhaps
reluctantly, self-report data, despite the fact that an overwhelming
number of parties lack sophisticated measurement technologies. 1
05
The difficulty in achieving a sufficient collective response is
exacerbated by the fact that the data available to the parties may be
inaccurate or incomplete. The Protocol only places the burden of
National Greenhouse Gas Inventories and detailed annual reporting on
Annex I parties. Non-Annex I countries are merely required to submit
national communications describing aspects of their implementation and
to provide any relevant information regarding their emissions and sink
removal data inventories. However, in practice, most non-Annex I parties
claim difficulties in meeting these minimal requirements and "indicated
that their technical and institutional capacities were inadequate to meet
103. Dale Jamieson, Uncertainty and Risk Assessment: Scientific Uncertainty and
the Political Process, 545 ANNALS 35, 36 (May 1996).
104. National Reports, supra note 32.
105. Over 180 parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change are involved in responding to climate change. However, the Kyoto Protocol
established ceilings on six specific greenhouse gases (e.g., carbon dioxide, methane,
nitrous oxide, perfluorocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons, and sulphur hexaflouride) for thirty-
eight countries, with the 15 European Union members treated as a single unit. See Kyoto
Protocol, supra note 12.
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their reporting obligations under the Convention[.]" 106
National Greenhouse Gas Inventories remain an ongoing
responsibility of Annex I countries. Non-Annex I countries do not have
this responsibility. The data upon which collective action relies for
support is limited because emissions figures for large emitting non-
Annex I parties such as China and India are missing. Some parties may
lack confidence in a collective action agreement based on an incomplete
picture of baseline data. A complete baseline would require information
from all major-emitters.
Additionally, the integrity of the data itself is difficult to ascertain.
As the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) reported in 1996, GHG
"emissions data was incomplete, unreliable, and inconsistent." '
Additionally, it often can be difficult to quantify emissions of some of
the six GHGs regulated by the Kyoto Protocol. 0 8 For example, carbon
dioxide data has greater reliability than methane and nitrous oxide, for
which emissions have not been assessed. 109
Since the 1996 GAO report, assessing and monitoring emissions
data has notably improved and parties consistently self-report emissions
data. However, the failure to include national inventories of some major-
emitters, regardless of their non-Annex I status, results in an incomplete
baseline which may cause inaccurate climate change impact predictions
and a misguided response. Also, as a result of the economic restructuring
of European Union states, most notably former Warsaw Pact members,
emissions have been significantly reduced. Consequently, the 1990
baseline level may be inflated and provide European economies a
competitive advantage over the United States." 0
106. UNFCCC, Sixth Compilation and Synthesis of Initial National
Communications from Parties Not Included in Annex I to the Convention, Note by
Secretariat, Addendum, Inventories ofAnthropogenic Emissions By Sources and
Removals by Sinks of Greenhouse Gases 10, FCC/SBI/2005/18/Add.2 (Oct. 25, 2005).
107. 1996 GAO REPORT ON DIFFICULTIES ASSESSING COUNTRIES' STABILIZING
EMIssIONS, supra note 58, at 2. Problems in appraising progress resulted from the
Convention's lack of reporting requirements and the limited ability to quantify certain
greenhouse gas emissions. Id. Problems associated with data reporting in determining
whether emissions goals are met for the Convention are also transferable to assessing the
impact human activities have on global climate change. In example, reliability regarding
carbon dioxide emissions data is higher than that of methane and nitrous oxide because
the latter gases are nontoxic, originate from a myriad of sources, and little effort has been
made to assess their emissions. Id. This limited reporting data results in a failure to
quantify methane and nitrous oxide emissions with certainty. Id. at 6.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Howard Rejects Emissions Targets, supra note 50; Kyoto Protocol, supra note
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2. Intergenerational Threat and Technology
The intergenerational aspect of climate change serves as another
reason some parties decline to take action, preferring to just "wait and
see." Despite the "intergenerational equity" principle of "doing all that
can be done to preserve the quality of the atmosphere," some participants
do not view the possibility of delayed global rewards as an adequate
justification to take action and incur immediate costs.111 Current climate
change impacts can be virtually invisible and future effects are even less
conceivable. Although public awareness regarding climate change is
increasing through the dissemination of magazines and movies on the
subject, climate change may not represent the risk of immediate loss of
human life and devastation which would likely spur more immediate
action. Moreover, some believe that we should wait for technological
developments to address our informational gaps and inefficient energy
production. As a result, these parties believe that the cautious choice is to
delay action, until the world is better equipped with the technology and
knowledge to assess and respond to the issue of climate change.
Climate change commentators highlight the importance of research
and development of new technologies to decrease emission control costs
and design alternatives to fossil fuel sources. 112 Future generations'
scientists may develop methods to stabilize the potential impacts of
GHGs on the Earth's atmosphere. Technology may also enable new
abatement or mitigation methods and provide better means of obtaining
information regarding these methods and their effectiveness..
The promise that future technology and scientific knowledge may
more effectively resolve climate change encourages parties to delay
collective action. President George W. Bush's response after receiving
the Committee on the Science of Climate Change's reply in June 2001
reflects this attitude. The President requested "innovative approaches...
measured, as we learn more from science[,]... flexible to adjust to new
information and [that] take advantage of new technology[, and]...
market-based incentives [that] spur technological innovation."11 3 Climate
change parties tend not to invest in an insurance policy or response-to
111. The Hague Declaration, supra note 18, at 1309.
112. Henry D. Jacoby et al., Kyoto's Unfinished Business, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 4
(July/August 1998).




avoid future risks and potential intergenerational impacts because these
risks likely are only to be felt by future generations-unless they act
based upon a duty to society and their children.'
1 14
3. Economics
In addition to background issues of the threat, economics plays a
major role in whether parties will act collectively to address climate
change. The economics of this global threat involves questions of
perceived implementation costs, the role of particular industries in the
emissions problem, and computer modeling in estimating the costs.
Estimating possible environmental and socioeconomic harms or costs
resulting from climate change is encumbered by uncertainty as well." 5
Nevertheless, the economic impact of climate change is a key variable in
generating global action. Parties may be discouraged from acting
collectively to address climate change if mitigation and abatement costs
exceed the perceived benefits of action. Furthermore, where a party
perceives benefits from climate change itself, that party will also be
deterred from participating in collective action. Both the economic
impact and the costs of collectives play major roles in determining who
will act and what world-wide action should be taken.
a. Cost Issues
Corporations and individual citizens who must commit to global
emissions reductions will be the immediate cost bearers of collective
action. Climate change agreements commit not only governments, but
also the public to take certain actions."16 Many participants worry that
114. Interview with Matt Petersen, President and Chief Executive Officer, Global
Green (Jan. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Petersen interview]. Global Green is the U.S. affiliate
of Green Cross International, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Chairman. This national
environmental organization addresses global climate change, eliminating weapons of
mass destruction, and providing safe drinking water. Global Green, About Global Green,
http://www.globalgreen.org/aboutlondex.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
115. This article will not address the possible economic damage caused by global
climate change itself. A 2002 report by Innovest Strategic Value Advisors on behalf of
the United Nations Environment Program's Finance Initiatives' Climate Change Working
Group indicates climate change impacts such as devastating storms would cost $150
billion a year within ten years. Climate Change Costs $150 Bln a Year: Report, London
(Reuters) (October 8, 2002). Furthermore, although this article will not fully discuss the
extensive costs involved in researching climate change and its impacts, by 1998 "[t]he
United States [had] already been averaging a $1 billion annual investment ... on global
change research." Alex G. Hanafi, Note, Joint Implementation: Legal and Institutional
Issues for an Effective International Program to Combat Climate Change, 22 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. 441,451 (1998).
116. Richard N. Cooper, Toward a Real Global Warming Treaty, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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supporting climate change response programs could, by diverting
resources, stifle economic development and industrial competitiveness in
their respective countries.
Cost bearers may not be willing to accept current economic losses
to avoid future risks and may instead prefer to accept future adverse
impacts of climate change. Moreover, economic interests of the
participants play a major role in determining whether the parties can
reach a viable agreement, especially since all emitting nations have an
underlying goal of industrialization and economic profit.
Once parties agree to collectively address climate change, they must
translate any of the agreement's obligations into domestic policy. The
implementation of international treaties within a country may be
frustrated by existing domestic policies that might conflict with the goals
of the treaty. Worldwide efforts to combat climate change likely require
countries to initiate policies that reduce reliance on fossil fuels, the
leading source of the world's energy. 11 7 To fulfill national treaty
obligations, governments must influence and incentivize their citizens
and corporations to act in prescribed ways. It is foreseeable that
politically influential corporations that perceive the costs to be
unbearable will attempt to undermine government endeavors by trying to
influence the public with rhetorical attacks on the underlying science.
Costs associated with mitigating or abating climate change also
cause major fault lines in international environmental politics between
the developed North and the developing South and will be discussed in
Part III.C. Those emerging conflicts related to international
environmental lawmaking should be evaluated as economic-issue
conflicts rather than purely as environmental issues. 118 International
environmental law is tied to economic development as well as the
geopolitics of global wealth distribution.1 9 Economically-advanced
parties may be more willing to support action to address transboundary
environmental degradation because they are more financially stable, feel
greater responsibility for the problem, or have a greater ability to address
the issue because they are not overwhelmed by basic national issues such
as poverty. In any case, the affluent, developed countries of the North
and the poorer, developing nations of the South disagree over how to
best address climate change in the context of the global economy.
66 Mar/Apr. 1998 (arguing that we must inform the public to gain support for climate
change agreements).
117. Unless carbon sequestration can be worked out.
118. Mark A. Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation in International




No adequate agreement may be obtained until governments,
industry, and individual citizens are willing to accept present costs to
address the risk of future harms. Collective action could ultimately stall
because the significant costs of mitigation and abatement methods may
seem too high for many cost bearers and the benefits from emitting may
outweigh the risks of climate change impacts.
b. Industry Impacts and Input
The economic interests of corporations exerted through lobbyists
plays a major role in whether and what type of action will be taken to
address climate change. Collective action to combat climate change
involves reducing fossil fuels upon which many corporations rely., 20
Essentially, to decrease GHG emissions, developed and developing
nations must commit to replace fossil fuels, which would negatively
impact corporations that are involved in the production of these fuels or
have made investments in fossil fuel dependent means of production.
Any impact to these corporations would likewise affect national
economies. The costs of transition to an economy based on alternate fuel
sources are significant even without mitigation costs. During a transition
period, corporations would incur extensive costs in converting their
existing infrastructure to support alternate fuel use. Some economic
analysts, however, contend that reducing GHG emissions will not be as
costly as anticipated, even in industrialized economies."'
120. As the U.S. General Accounting Office warned in 1990, "[d]eveloping a
worldwide strategy to slow global warming will be economically and politically
contentious because it will involve a decreased reliance on fossil fuels, which currently
provide over 75% of the world's energy." 1990 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 5. In the
past, some observers asserted fossil fuel interests, primarily the "carbon club" of "coal,
oil, and other fossil fuel-related industry umbrella groups," will go so far as to engage in
"manipulation, distortion, sabotage or lying at the climate negotiations" attempting "to
derail the climate convention" (1990-2005) by "watering down" scientific climate change
reports among other activities. Posting of Jeremy Leggett, Carbon Wars, April 25, 2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/apr/25/exxonmobilslonglivedemulatio
(last visited Sept. 5, 2008). asserting Exxon-Mobil is one of the remaining "climate-treaty
wreckers." See also JEREMY LEGGETT, THE CARBON WAR (1999). Some even predicted
that industry-funded lobby groups intended to "undermine" the IPCC report, published in
February 2007. David Adam, Scientists Fear New Attempts to Undermine Climate
Action, THEGUARDiAN.cO.UK, April 21, 2006, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/climatechange/story/0,, 1 758233,00.html.
121. For example a 1992 macro-economic study of the Federal Republic of
Germany argues:
policies to improve energy efficiency and to shift the energy mix to advanced
technologies and less carbon-intensive fuels will generate four important kinds
of benefits for the national economy. Such policies will 1) spur overall
economic growth, 2) quickly generate a large number of jobs within the
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Absent explicit industry pressure, nations may still decline to
support collective action to address climate change because they fear that
their economic growth, productivity, corporate competitiveness, and
wealth would suffer unnecessarily by diversions of resources to support
global climate change programs. 122 Some analysts contend that replacing
fossil fuels or reducing their use as directed in the Protocol regardless of
United States participation could impact the global demand for oil and
natural gas, and in turn reduce oil demand and producer prices.
1 23
Furthermore, the implications for natural gas use remain unclear because
reducing fossil fuel consumption "will lead to substitution of carbon-
intensive coal with natural gas in electricity markets."' 24 Most economic
models indicate that a two percent loss of the world Gross Domestic
Product would result if carbon emissions are reduced by fifty percent
from baseline levels by the middle of the twenty-first century. 
125
c. Inconsistencies in Economic Computer Modeling
Economic models used in assessing potential costs incurred from
GHG emission abatement differ depending on assumptions. Similar to
the scientific proof and computer modeling problems discussed
previously, the differing results that competing economic models provide
may be used as rationalization for some nations to act and others to resist
action. 126 Similar to computer modeling used for climate predictions, the
country (including the sort of entrepreneurial jobs which encourage a
resourceful, self-sufficient, and satisfied work force), 3) increase exports of
high technology products, and 4) reduce environmental and social costs of
energy use that were previously uncounted in the market transactions for fuel.
Eberhard Jochem & Olav Hohmeyer, The Economics of Near-Term Reductions in
Greenhouse Gases 217, Editor's note, in CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE: RISKS,
IMPLICATIONS & RESPONSES (Irving M. Mintzer, ed, 1992).
122. Perry E. Wallace, Global Climate Change and the Challenge to Modern
American Corporate Governance, 55 SMU L.REV. 493, 511 (2002).
123. DUNCAN AUSTIN & AMANDA SAUER, CHANGING OIL: EMERGING
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 11
(World Resources Institute 2002), available at http://pubs.wri.org/changingoilfull.pdf.
124. Id.
125. WILLIAM R. CLINE, THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL WARMING 7 (1992). However,
carbon-abatement cost studies use different approaches (e.g., focusing on alternative
energy technologies or reinforcing the use of international trading). Additionally, cutback
costs rise when the baseline percentage is reduced, but over time decline due to the
widening range of technological alternatives from technical change. Id. However, a
decrease of abatement costs may result from afforestation or reduction in deforestation.
Id.
126. Even government agencies may engage in using economic modeling to sway
public opinion, and in some cases political action. In 2003, Senator Hollings (Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation) and Senator Kerry (Subcommittee on
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use of varying assumptions in economic cost modeling also causes a
wide disparity in economic impact predictions attendant to GHG
emissions abatement.
Economic models that assume no actions to control emissions are
taken are called the "base case" or "business-as-usual" case. 127 In these
scenarios, as emissions rise over time with increased economic output, it
will be more difficult to meet specific reduction targets and necessarily
higher control costs will result. 128 The higher the base case climate
impacts are, the greater the benefits of controlling emissions results. 129
Other assumptions controlling the "no action" alternative, are: 1) whether
new, low-cost, low-GHG-emitting technologies will be available; 2) the
extent to which consumers and producers can meet their needs through
substituting these technologies (substitution); 3) what government
policies will be put in place to control GHG emissions; and, 4) whether
environmental benefits due to reducing GHGs are included in the
quantitative analysis of control costs. 130
Similarly, a World Resources Institute study indicates that
predictions of costs for reducing GHG emissions differ depending on
certain economic model assumptions. 131 Variances in the following
assumptions account for eighty percent of the differences in projected
costs: 1) whether competitively-priced non-fossil energy alternatives will
be available, 2) whether firms and consumers will efficiently reallocate
Oceans, Fisheries and Coast Guard, Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation) requested that the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) review the
difference in reports from the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) and the Energy
Information Administration (EIA) providing cost estimates if the United States
implemented the Kyoto Protocol. U.S. GOv'T ACCT. OFF., ESTIMATED COSTS OF THE
KYOTO PROTOCOL, GAO-04-144R (2004). The CEA estimated the cost at $7 to $12
billion while the EIA estimated a cost of $397. Id. The different estimates, according to
GAO, resulted due to two assumptions. First, if the model assumed that the United States
could not purchase emissions reductions from other nations (international emissions
trading), the estimated costs would be higher. Id. Second, when the economic model
assumed a slower-growing economy (GDP growth), less energy use would occur,
resulting in fewer emissions, and in turn, a smaller emissions reduction requirement. Id.
at 9.
127. John P. Weyant, Economic Models: How They Work & Why Their Results




130. Id. at 193-94.
131. ROBERT REPETrO & DUNCAN AUSTIN, THE COSTS OF CLIMATE PROTECTION: A
GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED, at Summary (World Resources Institute 1997), available at
http://pubs.wri.org/ccpsumm.pdf.
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expenditures as energy prices increase, 3) whether nations will take
advantage of joint implementation, 4) whether revenues from energy
taxes or auctioned-off carbon dioxide permits will be used to reduce
taxes on capital and labor, 5) whether fossil fuel consumption reductions
will decrease air pollution damages, 6) whether fossil fuel consumption
reductions will avert environmental damages resulting from climate
change, and 7) how much the model assumes energy sources,
technologies, products, and production substitution are possible. 
132
Not only do different economic model assumptions impact
predictions of mitigation and abatement costs, but various response
actions or policies also lead to differing predictions of economic
impacts. 133 For example, proposals for stabilizing and allowing no
emissions growth, such as the Kyoto Protocol framework and the United
States' internationally tradable emissions permits proposal,134 as opposed
132. Id.
133. The Pew Center on Global Climate Change has assessed that costs to the
United States to meet emissions targets vary depending on policy approaches, asserting
that, "the most cost-effective approaches allow emitters flexibility in deciding how to
meet a target; provide early direction so targets can be anticipated and factored into major
capital and investment decisions; and employ market-based mechanisms, such as
emissions trading, to achieve reductions where they cost the least." American
Investments for Reduction of Emissions Act of 2003: Hearing on draft of Act before the
S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp. 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Eileen
Claussen, President, Pew Center on Global Climate Change ), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/claussenO0803.pdf.
134. In negotiating the Kyoto Protocol, the United States attempted to include
emissions trading as part of the Climate Change Convention. David M. Driesen, Free
Lunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change Convention,
26 B.C. ENVT. AFF. L. REV. 1,25 (1998). The Protocol, however, only allows
industrialized countries to : 1) increase their cap by purchasing other industrialized
nations' Kyoto allocation; 2) earn credits by jointly implementing specific emission
reduction projects; and 3) earn credits by implementing projects with developing nations.
VICTOR, supra note 37, at 4. The Protocol does not include any emissions trading
between developing and developed countries. The United States' proposed a system-at
first open to developed nations and then offered to developing nations-of internationally
tradable emissions permits with a total limit of 1990 emissions distributed based on
nation population or each countries' 1990 emissions and which would be available for
sale or purchase on the international market. Warwick J. McKibbin & Peter J. Wilcoxen,
A Better Way to Slow Global Climate Change 1, 1-2, POLICY BRIEF #17 (Brookings
Institute, 1997), available at http://www.brook.edu/comm/PolicyBriefs/pb0 17/pb I 7.htm.
McKibbin and Wilcoxen argue that such a system is flawed in that it: 1) focuses on
stabilizing emissions when reducing growth is the better option; 2) entails difficult and
costly monitoring and enforcing; and 3) results in large transfers of wealth between
nations (which in turn will hinder treaty ratification because many countries will be
unhappy about such transfers) and could drastically impact exchange rates, trade
balances, and international capital flows. Id. at 1. See also U.S. GOV'T ACCT. OFF.,
ESTIMATED COSTS OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, supra note 126 (indicating that if the United
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to reducing emissions growth, could also entail a more drastic economic
impact. 135
Disputes between parties involved in collective action to address
climate change inevitably arise because money is involved. Whether the
background factor of economic incentive promotes action depends on
who the winners and losers are in a particular reduction plan. In any case,
as long as mitigation and abatement cost data remains in dispute, parties
are likely to lean upon these uncertainties as an excuse to delay
participation in collective action. Regardless of the assumptions that
cause inconsistent results in economic modeling and in assessing costs
incurred for abatement, uncertainty is a significant obstacle to collective
action.
C. Group Elements at the Climate Change Negotiating Table
[S]ince the success of international collective action generally
requires broad participation, some countries that place low net
values on the agreement may adopt hold-out strategies in order to
extort payments from others. 136
- Joseph R. Bial & Gary D. Libecap, 1999
At the negotiating table, parties addressing a transboundary harm or
a global commons dilemma encounter other representatives with
predetermined judgments regarding what response, if any, is appropriate.
Global collective bargaining participants will also find that group factors
such as the size of the parties, composition of the negotiating body,
negotiation or interaction rules, and party strategies influence the
consensus process. Additional complications exist as parties encounter a
myriad of policy positions expressed by NGOs, global agencies and
coalitions. Furthermore, the tendency of developed nations of the North
and the developing nations of the South to disagree on a variety non-
climate issues further complicates negotiations. While preexisting
judgments and entrenched alliances can hinder the negotiation process,
coalition building has the potential to simplify the process.
States could not purchase emissions reductions from other nations, international
emissions trading, the estimated costs to implement the Kyoto Protocol would be higher).
135. See McKibbin & Peter J. Wilcoxen, supra note 134, at 4 ("[S]tudies to date
suggest that the costs [to stabilize or hold emissions] exceed the benefits . . .Estimates of
the cost of holding emissions constant range from -0.5% (an increase in GDP) to 2% of
GDP annually; most fall in the range of I to 2 %.... the benefit of stabilization is simply
the sum of the avoided costs of damages that higher temperatures would cause.").
136. Bial & Libecap, supra note 65, at 6 (footnote omitted).
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1. Players
The sheer number of participants in global bargaining complicate
negotiations. Past international collective negotiations that addressed
transboundary environmental problems have involved many participants:
states, global or international agencies, and non-state participants such as
NGOs corporations and the media. 137 For example, the 1992 Rio Earth
Summit involved over 100 heads of state, 8,000 delegates, 3,000 NGO
representatives, and 9,000 representatives from the press.1
38
State participants at the global negotiating table have also increased.
The number of recognized sovereign states has risen from thirty-four at
the start of the twentieth century, to fifty-one in 1945 at the
establishment of the United Nations, and 188 United Nations member
states at the start of the twenty-first century, not including several other
non-United Nations states.' 3 9 The regime charged with addressing the
transboundary issue of climate change includes 186 individual
governments and the European Community and meets at the annual
Conference of the Parties to discuss the UNFCCC negotiating process. 140
137. As a result, some observers call for an authoritative international institution to
compel compliance. For example, as Daniel Bodansky noted, seventeen heads of state
that endorsed The Hague Declaration "called for 'new institutional authority' that
involves non-unanimous decision making,... to combat global climate change. It is hard
to imagine how problems such as global climate change will be successfully addressed,
without the eventual establishment of more authoritative international institutions to set
standards and oversee compliance." Bodansky, supra note 63, at 599 (footnote omitted).
The United Nations Charter itself does not address specific environmental concerns. See
Palmer, supra note 67, at 259 contending that "the United Nations lacks any coherent
institutional mechanism for dealing effectively with environmental issues," the "Charter
itself provides no environmental organ" and "[a]side from a reference to 'good
neighborliness,' it contains nothing" regarding the environment. Id. at 260.
138. RICHARD N. GARDNER. NEGOTIATING SURVIVAL: FoUR PRIORITIES AFTER RiO 1
(1992).
139. Edith Brown Weiss, The Robert L. Levine Distinguished Lecture Series: The
Rise or the Fall of International Law?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 349 (2000).
140. See UNFCCC, supra note 20; United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, "Guide to the Climate Change Negotiation Process," available at
http://unfccc.int/not_assigned/b/items/2555.php. Prior to coming to the global negotiating
table, membership in certain organizations may also provide a preview of where a party
may stand on specific issues. Additionally, such organizations may disseminate
information regarding issues and assist in focusing agendas. For example, the United
Nations Environment Programme, which evolved from the 1972 Stockholm Conference,
is devoted to promoting universal and regional environmental law and plays a leading
role in promoting regional conventions. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the
International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 420, 423 (1991). Outside the
United Nations system, the World Bank and other international organizations also formed
the Committee of International Development Institutions on the Environment in 1980,
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Although state delegations continue to be the primary actors in
global negotiations, corporations and NGOs have also assumed many of
the complex tasks that states previously performed. 141 Individuals from
NGOs may be included in a government delegation, a national
delegation, or a formal advisory group. 142 NGOs may send delegates to
international conferences, be included as members of international
organizations, may participate in policy development or preparatory
committees, or give presentations at international organizations' special
sessions. 143 NGOs broaden the base of an organization's decision-
making structure by providing specific subject matter expertise and
representing divergent societal views. 1
44
NGOs in today's international environmental law arena have
come to perform a myriad of functions. Primarily, NGOs exert their
influence by participating in the international decisionmaking process by
focusing on codifying and developing international law, developing new
convention proposals, drafting treaty language, and participating in
negotiations. 145 In particular, the value of NGOs has been evidenced by
correcting treaty mistakes, pointing out inconsistencies in proposals, and
serving as official state delegation members. 146 Other NGO activities
center on enforcing international law and promoting the public interest
by informal strategies such as mobilizing public opinion pressures on
governments, making personal appeals to decision-makers, and
providing expert support for international lawmakers. 147
which provides "opportunities for integrating environmental issues into the plans of
financial and developmental organizations." Palmer, supra note 67, at 261 & n. 10.
141. Weiss, supra note 139, at 349-50. In 1998-99, the Yearbook of International
Organizations "record[ed] 'more than 6,415 intergovernmental organizations and 43,958
NGOs."' Id. "Other relevant actors include subunits of national governments,
corporations, domestic NGOs, ethnic minorities, illicit transnational groups, ad hoc
transnational associations, and individuals." Id.
142. Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International
Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 280-82 (1997).
143. Id.
144. Daniel C. Esty, Linkages and Governance: NGOs at The World Trade
Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 709, 718 (1998).
145. Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of Non-
Governmental Organizations Under International Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
579, 589 (1999).
146. Id. at 591-93.
147. Id. at 589-94. Due to the major influence NGOs have on international law and
involvement in the lawmaking process, many call for the development of a clearer legal
status for these organizations. See id.; A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Law: The Role of
Non-Governmental Organizations in the Development of International Environmental
Law, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 61 (1992). Essentially, without formal legal status NGOs "are
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In global negotiations on climate change, two kinds of NGOs-each
with highly divergent objectives-are prominent when addressing
climate change: 1) environmental NGOs which focus on reducing gas
emissions that may cause climate change, and 2) business NGOs which
represent industry interests as their operations impact climate change.
148
However, a broad controversy exists regarding whether to exclude for-
profit business entities from NGO status.
2. The Psychology of Strategy and Coalition Building
Once all the players arrive at the table, fundamental issues evolve
based on strategies and coalition building inherent in any collective,
multi-party negotiation process. When parties attempt to resolve global
commons problems, some opinions at the bargaining table may reflect
holdout strategies and predictable positions based on psychological
phenomena. 149
Other challenges based on party strategies may appear when
multiple states sit down to negotiate a collective action. Global
negotiations often involve the analytical framework that game theorists
at the mercy of international organizations and foreign domestic rules on access and
participation" but simultaneously are allowed "to define their role unconstrained by
law ... to develop more creative effective approaches to environmental protection than
those offered through litigation." Id., at 64.
148. Chiara Giorgetti, From Rio to Kyoto: A Study of the Involvement of Non-
Government Organizations in the Negotiations on Climate Change, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J.
201, 202 (1999).
149. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Innovations in Environmental Policy: The Psychology of
Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 299, 304-05. Parties will have different
attitudes toward risk. For example, some skeptics may use evidence supporting the belief
that the degree and impact of the threat are minimal (biased assimilation). Id. at 307.
Representatives at the table may also include individuals attached to the status quo who
may be unwilling to sacrifice benefits "in hand" to obtain other benefits (loss aversion) or
who will tolerate climate change and its risks but are reluctant to pay for reducing the risk
(status quo bias). Id. Still others may take positions reflecting "risk seeking preferences in
the face of loss" and may refuse to accept economic loss associated with mitigating the
impacts of the threat, choosing instead to incur the greater risk of the adverse impacts. Id.
at 309.
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identify as the Prisoner's Dilemma, 150 of which the tragedy of the
commons is a poignant example. 1
5 1
In a global commons scenario, the Prisoner's Dilemma may occur
when parties "pursue their individual self-interest [and] behave in a way
contrary to their shared collective interest," and which results in "the
power of self-interest in defeating any sense of moral obligation to
advance the common good, [and] the ability of free-riders to undermine
or even destroy the benefits of communally conscious actions."
1 52
Moreover, when a commons is unregulated, the competitive fear that
others will be the first to cheat has a tendency to override any intuitive
sense to restrain from polluting, and free-riding strategy becomes more
justified.153 In a Prisoner's Dilemma situation restraint does not occur
"for fear that others will benefit by maximizing their own self-interest.
150. The Prisoner's Dilemma as described above is presented in extensive game
theory literature. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). Game
theorists often contend that in the fundamental public goods/collective action paradox
(i.e., a tragedy of the commons situation like global climate change) consists of
"individuals acting rationally in pursuit of their own interests will produce an undesired
collective outcome" resulting in a Prisoner's Dilemma decisional game. David B. Spence,
Paradox Lost: Logic, Morality, and the Foundations of Environmental Law in the 21st
Century, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 145, 147 (1995). The Prisoner's Dilemma game occurs
when two co-defendants face the quandary of whether to confess and incriminate each
other. Both prisoners are better off if they both refuse to confess (mutual cooperation
with each other) because the authorities will have less evidence, and they both will
receive a lesser sentence for a less egregious offense (optimum consequence). However,
if one prisoner confesses and the other does not, the prosecution can use the confessor's
admission against the co-defendant (who will receive the maximum sentence) and the
confessor will obtain a lesser sentence, if the co-defendant does not confess. If both co-
defendants confess (mutual defection), they will receive severe, but not maximum
sentences. Both prisoners will use the same reasoning. They want "the lighter sentence,
but logic seems to condemn [them] to serving twice as long in prison." Wayne Eastman,
How Coasean Bargaining Entails a Prisoners' Dilemma, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 92
(1996). Rational choice theorists have applied game theory to many fields such as
economics and international relations. See DREw FUNDENERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME
THEORY (1991) (applying game theory to economic problems).
151. Tseming Yang, The Form and Substance of Environmental Justice: The
Challenge of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for Environmental Regulation, 29
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 143, 202 (2002).
152. Id. at 203.
153. Michael lg, Environmental Harm and Dilemmas of Self-Interest: Does
International Law Exhibit Collective Learning, 18 TuL. ENvTL. L.J. 59, 78 (2004).
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This creates a suboptimal ('Nash') equilibrium:' 54 a strategy that none
find ideal but that each fears another will choose."' 155
Notably, multi-player Prisoner's Dilemma models rarely lead to
improved outcomes over two-player models. 156 Rather, game theorists
contend that the choice to defect still dominates strategy. 157 Even though
the universal multi-player payoff for cooperation proves to be the
superior choice over defection, it is hard to achieve. 158 Additionally, non-
universal multi-party defection and cooperation payoffs increase with the
number of players. 159 In a multi-player Prisoner's Dilemma game,
achieving mutual cooperation from a critical number of major GHG
emitters-players-may be frustrated by the problems of conflicting
science and economic models and inability to identify the required
number of players. 160 Even if the number is identified, reaching that
number requires "advertent coordination or coalition building."'1 6
1
Aside from strategy issues in multilateral negotiations, coalition
building often involves several types of key participants. Multilateral
negotiations addressing trade, arms control, and environmental
agreements all involve a coalition building process among states, non-
state players, and international organizations. 16  Ordinarily, coalition
building participants include: 1) experts defining pre-negotiation
possibilities and a negotiating agenda, 2) smaller, less powerful state
coalitions sustaining negotiation momentum and contributing to devising
bridging solutions when more powerful states deadlock, and
154. When there are two or more players, a "Nash equilibrium requires that each
player's strategy be a payoff-maximizing response to the strategies that he forecasts that
his opponents will use, and further that each player's forecast be correct." DREw
FUNDENERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY XIX (1995) (citing John F. Nash, Equilibrium
Points in N-Person Games, 36 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
48-9 (1950)).
155. 11g, supra note 153, at 170.
156. Susan Block-Lieb, Congress' Temptation to Defect: A Political and Economic





160. Id. at 814-15.
161. Id. at 814-15. "It is important that the game permits enforceable agreements to
cooperate to ensure the payoff from defection is not likely to be so tempting as to
preclude even a critical mass of players to cooperate in the one-shot game." Id. at 815.
162. FEN OSLER HAMPSON, MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS: LESSONS FROM ARMS
CONTROL, TRADE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 345 (1995).
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3) international agency officials forming strategic alliances with national
bureaucratic counterparts to move negotiations forward. 
163
3. North-South Division
During negotiations, coalitions typical in multi-party discussions
evolve. Pre-existing issues and party conflicts beyond the subject matter
of negotiations often resurface and encumber the process when
formulating an international environmental agreement. In practice, the
engrained relationships between the North's developed nations and the
South's developing nations have historically thwarted the negotiation
process when addressing global, transboundary problems. Differences in
economic and environmental priorities and views regarding
responsibility for environmental harm have often impeded consensus.
For example, North-South relations raise bitter disputes about
environmental issues, "with rich and poor countries divided over how to
address these issues in the context of the global economy, and over how
to apportion responsibility for reversing the planet's ecological
decline." 164
Developed nations, more than developing nations, tend to actively
propose multilateral environmental agreements because, as noted above,
the latter are usually preoccupied with immediate economic concerns
such as alleviating domestic poverty.1 65 Generally speaking, Northern
nations place a high priority on protecting natural resources and the
global environment, while those from the South seek to address near-
term concerns such as malnutrition, disease, contaminated water, and
polluted air. 166
Day-to-day critical issues, including population growth, income
disparities, and unreasonable exchange rates, frequently burden the
attention of developing countries and limit their action in the
environmental arena. 167 When less-developed nations do focus on
environmental issues, they tend to be such issues as providing safe
drinking water, arable land, indoor air, and accommodations for rapidly
growing populations.' 68 Nations in the South focus on short-term, basic
163. Id.
164. HILARY FRENCH, VANISHING BORDERS: PROTECTING THE PLANET IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION 10 (2000).
165. Drumbl, supra note 118, at 847.
166. Gary C. Bryner, Implementing Global Environmental Agreeements in the
Developing World, 1997 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. Y.B. 1, 19.
167. Id. (citing the UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1996)).
168. Drumbl, supra note 118, at 847.
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needs of their citizens and may be unable to participate in reducing
global, transboundary environmental harms whose effects are not always
readily apparent and are often only experienced in the mid to long-
term. 169 Consequently, countries from the North and South have different
perceptions regarding the benefits from, and the costs of acting
collectively. Developing nations may not place a high value on the
benefits of curbing environmental degradation and maintaining standards
set forth in multilateral agreements. Similarly, Southern nations may
perceive the benefits of collective action as too far in the future and be
unwilling to incur the costs of acting for delayed rewards.1 70 The South
seeks to have the North assume a greater responsibility for the problems
of the developing nations and wants the North to "acknowledge that
there must be a change in Northern lifestyles" to achieve greater fairness
in the allocation of global resources.
171
Developing nations also view costs differently than developed
countries. Direct costs (e.g., disbursements required to enact, implement,
and enforce requirements on a national level) and indirect costs (e.g.,
perceived adverse impact on industrial growth from environmental
regulation) combine to discourage developing nations from collective
action. 172 Some developing nations are not inclined to incur the direct
costs of enacting, implementing, and enforcing national requirements to
curb a global threat like climate change, or the indirect costs of potential
adverse impact on industrialization, especially when they perceive gains
as only a distant possibility. 173 Because they have higher short-term
opportunity costs, they value future gains less. Consequently, developing
nations sometimes choose not to participate in a collective action
response.
The North-South dichotomy also includes debate over whether
monetary funding to implement international environmental agreements
"will be added to the developmental assistance that is already provided to
the South ('additionality'), and what, if any, strings the North will attach
169. Id. at 852-53.
170. See GARDNER supra note 138. In negotiations during the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (Rio Earth Summit), a group of
developing countries initially blamed the industrialized nations for poverty and
environmental degradation and wanted part of the North's wealth and technology without
assuming any commitments. Id. The industrialized nations saw global benefits exceeding
the costs to act collectively at the Earth Summit. Id.
171. See LAWRENCE E. SussKIND, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: NEGOTIATING
MORE EFFECTIVE GLOBAL AGREEMENTS 121 (1994).
172. Drumbl, supra note 118, at 848.
173. See SUSSKIND, supra note 171.
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to these funds ('conditionality')."' 174 Disagreement arises regarding the
meaning and direction of economic development, with the North
asserting that environmental responses can be achieved within the
present economic development framework and the South contending that
its current environmental and national problems result from the dominant
paradigm of economic development that the North has long benefited
from. 17
5
Developed nations perceive the benefits and costs of acting
differently than developing countries. Collective action addressing a
transboundary harm includes bearable costs for a greater, global good.
As reflected at the Rio Earth Summit negotiations in 1992, industrialized
nations view acting collectively as raising the South's environmental
standards. 176 Raising those standards in the long-run can resolve global,
transboundary problems, level the international trade playing field for
developed nations' firms already subject to strict environmental
regulation, and create a developing world market for "clean technologies
and environmental goods and services.' 177 Furthermore, the North
generally refuses to agree to the South's demand that the North assume a
greater responsibility for the problems of developing nations or to force
changes to the standard of living of Northern citizens to achieve a greater
fairness in allocating global resources. 178
Group factors such as the North-South division impede agreement
in multi-party negotiations. However, parties may employ specific tools
to overcome this potential obstacle to consensus.1 79 Parties at the
Montreal Protocol negotiating table overcame the North-South division
by including the common but differentiated responsibility principle-that
is, all parties are required to act (common), but developed nations incur
more obligations (differentiated).1 80 While this principle may create
174. Id. at 18.
175. Id. at 19 (citing THIJS DE LA COURT, BEYOND BRUNDTLAND (1990) (describing
the Third World's response to the BRUNDTLAND REPORT, THE REPORT OF THE UNITED
NATIONS WORLD COMMISsION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT.))
176. GARDNER supra note 138, at 9-10.
177. Id.
178. SUSSKIND, supra note 171, at 21.
179. For example, in negotiating the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That
Deplete the Ozone Layer, developing nation participation was vital because increased use
of chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) in the South (especially China and India) could have
negated the participating nations' emissions reductions. Bryner, supra note 166, at 5.
180. Laura Thoms, A Comparative Analysis of International Regimes on Ozone and
Climate Change with Implications for Regime Design, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 795,
811 (2003). See generally, RICHARD BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN
SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET (1991). In the 1987 Montreal Protocol nations agreed to
reduce their chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) and halon production and consumption to 1986
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conflict in some circumstances, 181 the Montreal Protocol and its London
Amendment (1990) clearly articulated this principle. Under these
agreements, developing nations were permitted to delay the
implementation of the CFC reductions for ten years and even were
allowed some increase. Additionally, the agreements established a
multilateral fund to assist developing nations with compliance and to
enable technology transfer from developed nations of the best available,
environmentally-safe substitutes for polluting industries. 182
The Montreal and Rio multilateral negotiations reflect that group
factors- strategy, coalition building, and entrenched allegiances such as
the North-South division-can hinder consensus. Parties should
understand and anticipate these coalitions and group factors before
participating in an international collective action. If they account for
these factors, parties will be better prepared to predict, understand, and
respond to the concerns and priorities of opposing groups. Furthermore,
opposing parties that understand the motivations and pressures facing
levels followed by a fifty percent reduction in ten years for industrialized countries. 1987
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26 I.L.M. 1529 (1987)
[hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; Bruce Ledewitz & Robert D. Taylor, Law and the
Coming Environmental Catastrophe, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 599, 613 (1997).
181. See discussion infra Part IV (describing how this international environmental
law principle, without a clear definition, may adversely impact collective action).
182. Thorns, supra note 180, at 811-12. These equity-based provisions ensured
developing nation participation (especially for major CFC users such as China, India, and
Brazil) in the agreement. Id. at 812. As Thorns points out, the common but differentiated
responsibility principle also exists in the climate change regime, but those provisions
have not convinced the United States and developing nations to participate in the climate
change collective action. Id. at 822. Following the Montreal Protocol, the 1992 Rio Earth
Summit was predicted to be "the 'great shout-out in the eco-corral[,]' a North-South
confrontation that would rival in intensity the East-West confrontation of the Cold War
era." GARDNER supra note 138, at 7. This prediction proved partially correct, but the lines
drawn were more complicated than a clear North-South boundary. Id. The Group of 77
(developing countries), (see Lavanya Rajamani, Re-negotiating Kyoto: A Review of the
Sixth Conference of Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2000
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 201, n.71) initially sought to blame the North's
industrialized nations for poverty and environmental degradation and wanted only to
share in the North's wealth and technology without assuming responsibility for future
commitments. GARDNER supra note 139, at 7. The industrialized nations saw global
benefits exceeding the costs to act collectively at the Earth Summit. In part, developing
countries compromised and established the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, Agenda 21 (comprehensive sustainable development action plan for
governments) and statement of forest management principles, due to the lack of support
from the Soviet-communist bloc which previously assisted them in negotiations. Id. See




each other are more likely to be sympathetic with each other and
ultimately be more likely to compromise to reach consensus.
IV. PRINCIPLES AFFECTING COLLECTIVE ACTION
Even if all parties transcended self-interest to overcome the global
commons problems, disagreements involving distribution of
responsibilities in responding to climate change would hinder achieving
consensus. Several well-established principles of international
environmental law which establish some guidelines regarding
responsibilities may influence, and in some cases, hinder progress toward
achieving collective action addressing climate change. Specifically, as
discussed and defined below, the sustainable development, the
precautionary, intergenerational equity, common but differentiated
responsibilities, and the polluter pays principles all impact progress. Due
to their broad, unclear definitions, commitments to these general
principles may be interpreted differently by various parties and
ambiguous meanings may lead to further disputes among the parties as to
when a particular action is required. This ambiguity impedes collective
action because no agreement exists regarding what these terms actually
mean, and parties might consider these to be commitments of legal
consequence.
General principles are guidelines that may represent unspecific
obligations and fail to delineate precisely which actions parties are
committed to take or when particular actions must occur. Nevertheless,
as will be discussed, some parties argue these statements represent
promises or implied commitments. Others may contend that these
principles are purely hortatory statements carrying no obligations.
Regardless, parties that fail to fulfill these collective action promises or
commitments do not face formalized, legally binding consequences
because of the lack of corresponding enforceable compliance provisions.
A. Sustainable Development and the Precautionary Principle
Parties responding to climate change may find the sustainable
development principle a complication in reaching a consensus on climate
change action. For example, in 1987, the World Commission on
Environment and Development ("Brundtland Commission") urged
nations to support sustainable development by meeting "the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
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their own needs."'' 8 3 Those using this term initially sought to tie
economic progress with environmental stewardship and integrate the two
in policy choices and business dealings. 184 Nonetheless, critics argue that
the term has become "devoid of content," and the public has no concept
as to what the promise of "sustainable development" entails. 
85
By 1992, the UNFCC incorporated sustainable development in
Articles 3 and 4. Article 3 states, "[tihe [p]arties have a right to, and
should, promote sustainable development."'' 86 Article 4 further requires
the parties to:
[p]romote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the
conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs
of all GHGs not controlled by the Montreal Protocol [on Substances
That Deplete the Ozone Layer], including biomass, forests and
oceans as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems. 187
Despite the parties' initial hopefulness in establishing sustainable
development as a standard, today the concept has morphed into a "soft"
goal without a specific definition. 88 Parties have merely created a term
which initially reflected a commendable focus, but has evolved into lofty
rhetoric. Use of the term sustainable development allows developing
countries to argue that developed nations have impliedly promised not to
compromise their future generations from the ability to meet their future
resource requirements. With such an existing commitment, some nations
assert that parties must participate in a global climate change response
regardless of potential adverse impacts to their own country. However,
under the generally accepted current meaning of the term, parties
agreeing to sustainable development are committing to a broad goal
rather than crafting a concrete, focused objective which will translate
into specific actions to curb the threat of global warming, sea level rise,
more severe storms, or other clear, adverse environmental impacts.
183. International Environmental Law: Concepts and Issues, World Bank Group
(2002), available at http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/legen/legen.iel.html (quoting the
1987 Brundtland Committee Report) [hereinafter International Environmental Law:
Concepts and Issues]. The Rio Declaration embodies this concept, stating that "[tjhe
creativity, ideals and courage of the youth of the world should be mobilized to forge a
global partnership in order to achieve sustainable development and ensure a better future
for all." Rio Declaration, supra note 182, at 879.
184. Daniel C. Esty, A Term's Limits, FOREIGN POLICY 74 (Sept./Oct. 2001).
185. Id.
186. UNFCCC, supra note 20, at 854.
187. Id. at 855.
188. See Esty, supra note 184, at 74-75 (stating that, "for all its laudable goals and




In addition to sustainable development, in some agreements, parties
have included another broad, difficult to define concept-the
precautionary principle.189 This principle as set forth in the Rio
Declaration (Principle 15) and JNFCCC (Article 3) can frustrate
consensus. 19  The UNFCCC states, "[t]he [p]arties should take
precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the cause of
climate change and mitigate its adverse effects."' 191 Essentially, when
dealing with the climate change issue, nations are encouraged to act "to
ensure that the loading capacity of the environment is not exhausted,
and... action even if risks are not yet certain."' 
92
The precautionary principle encourages action without waiting for
firm climate change science regarding causes and abatement effects.
However, various parties have different visions as to what action is
required and when. In the climate change arena, without solid scientific
evidence that a problem actually exists, the precautionary principle
seems to highlight the notion that action is premature.' 
93
The underlying agreement that nations "should" take anticipatory
preventive or precautionary measures to mitigate climate change effects
reflects an undefined principle subject to controversy. The precautionary
principle allows parties to argue that nations have impliedly committed
to act regardless of the scientific basis or estimated costs. Some emitters,
however, may oppose action because it entails imposing costs for
safeguards without clear evidence of negative environmental impacts.
Those opposing action assert that uncertain science does not demand this
189. As some authors note, many versions of the precautionary principle exist and
"often with cognate phrasing, as to belie the pretensions of the definite article."
Christopher D. Stone, Is there a Precautionary Principle?, 31 ELR 10790 (2001)
(internal footnote omitted). See also, Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Rational Choice:
New Perspectives and Legal Implications: Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U.
PA. L. REv. 1003 (2003); Jonathan B. Weiner, Whose Precaution After All?: A Comment
on the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 207 (2003).
190. In Rio, the parties agreed that, "to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation." Rio Declaration, supra note 182, at 879.
191. UNFCCC, supra note 20, at 854 (emphasis added).
192. Gregory D. Fullem, Comment, The Precautionary Principle: Environmental
Protection in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 31 WILLIAMETTE L. REv. 495, 498
(1995).
193. Some commentators criticize the precautionary rule as an "uncertain decision
rule." See Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 851,859 (1996).
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"artificial decision rule," but rather "policymakers should confront the
scientific uncertainty and act prudently in accord with the best possible
scientific understanding"-acting with precaution, but considering and
compensating for the attendant risks. 194 This is not to say that nations
will require complete scientific evidence prior to action, but controversy
exists regarding how much action, if any, should be taken in light of the
current knowledge and all there is to learn about the costs and the
science. 195
B. Intergenerational Equity
The theory of intergenerational equity and the ensuing obligation
also raises issues when seeking a global consensus. The Hague parties, in
their 1989 Declaration, agreed that problems of "planet-wide" scope
require global-level solutions and remedies that involve "the fundamental
duty to preserve the ecosystem.., and the consequent duty of the
community of nations vis-a-vis present and future generations to do all
that can be done to preserve the quality of the atmosphere." 196 In the
1993 Rio Declaration, the parties also agreed that "[t]he right to
development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and
environmental needs of present and future generations." 1
97
It is not surprising to see nations and policymakers generally
commit to protect the environment and agree to limit development to
benefit future generations. However, despite the general notion of
intergenerational equity, when deciding how to actually implement
solutions to address climate change, parties often find excuses based on
the uncertainties discussed supra, in Part III.B. Most often the excuse for
inaction relies upon the uncertainty of science.1 98 A lack of universal
definition of intergenerational equity provides little guidance on how to
meet general obligations.
The undefined theory of intergenerational equity results in a lack of
agreement on burden sharing. Developing nations assert that the phrase
"equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and
future generations"' 99 reflects a commitment that developed nations bear
the costs of collective action because equity to present generations calls
194. Id. at 862.
195. Stone, supra note 189 (footnote omitted).
196. The Hague Declaration, supra note 17, at 1309.
197. Rio Declaration, supra note 182, at 877.
198. See discussion supra Part 111.B (discussing scientific uncertainty and the
intergenerational threat).
199. Rio Declaration, supra note 182, at 877 (emphasis added).
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for them to bear the burden. Developing nations also contend that when
responding to climate change, industrialized nations have committed to
intergenerational equity, and thereby have agreed that they owe future
generations and must consider responding as part of their duty derived
from their commitments in the Hague and Rio Declarations. Again, this
international environmental law principle causes controversy regarding
when a "fundamental duty" to act is triggered and what the Hague
Declaration meant by "all that can be done."
C. Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Polluter Pays
Another ambiguous equity principle that may hinder consensus
among the climate change parties is the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities. The Rio Declaration, Principle 7,200 and
UNFCCC, Article 3, state: "[i]n view of the different contributions to
global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated
responsibilities., 20 1 The UNFCCC further encourages the parties to:
protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities .... the developed [nations] should take the lead in
combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.
202
The common but differentiated commitment implies that everyone
should act (common) but developed nations should incur more
obligations (differentiated). Questions arise regarding whether
differentiated responsibility merely entails a greater, more rapid
response, or rather different financial obligations for developed nations.
Moreover, developing nations may assert that all major GHG-emitting
nations have a duty to protect against climate change and a greater
responsibility to take preventative or corrective action because they
caused more environmental degradation and benefited from past
pollution, yet currently possess technological and financial advantages to
address the problem.
While agreeing that developing and developed nations should have
different responsibilities, some nations, such as the United States, assert
200. Principle 7 seems to place more responsibility on developed nations by further
stating that, "developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the
international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies
place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they
command." Rio Declaration, supra note 182, at 877.
201. Id.
202. UNFCCC, supra note 20, at 854-55.
2008]
Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y
that major-emitters, despite their status as developing nations, must be
required to commit to reductions and that without their formal
commitment, a global response cannot succeed.20 3 The United States
argues that a global response like the Kyoto Protocol, which exempts
countries such as China and India (major GHG emitters causing
environmental degradation), will be inadequate. This argument is
consistent with the polluter pays principle, a prevailing theme of
domestic environmental laws.20 4 This principle suggests that polluters
should bear the proportionate economic costs of polluting, regardless of
their overall state of development.
Common but differentiated responsibilities coupled with the theory
that polluters should pay results in varying goals when crafting a global
response to climate change. All of the parties have a common duty to
respond, but should bear different responsibilities in responding to
pollution. Additionally, under these theories, developed nations should
take responsibility for past pollution, while developing nations should
not be held responsible for past environmental degradation. In the
climate change context, however, the difficulty arises where many
emitters may not feel compelled to respond at all. Common but
differentiated responsibilities can imply that developed nations should
commit to abatement and mitigation actions and pay for pollution even if
unaddressed climate change may positively impact their economies. As
discussed earlier, some parties will actually benefit from the effects of
their GHG emissions and global climate change. For example, countries,
"such as Canada and Russia, might experience no benefits from
emissions control, since they actually stand to gain from global climate
change (due to the effects of increased temperatures and precipitation on
agricultural production). '2 5
In summary, preexisting international environmental law principles
help explain the source of failure in achieving global agreement and are
lauded as justifications for differing views regarding when
responsibilities are triggered and what actions are included in those
undefined responsibilities. Rather than providing workable guidelines,
they interject uncertainty and contention as some parties may argue these
general principles represent duties to act and that commitments arising
203. See President Bush Discusses Climate Change, supra note 38.
204. This principle has also been written into many international environmental
agreements. For example, the Rio Declaration states that, "[n]ational authorities should
endeavor to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic
instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear
the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting
international trade and investment." Rio Declaration, supra note 182, at 879.
205. Stavins, supra note 53, at 298.
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from these principles should have legal consequence. Without
understanding the full ramifications of ambiguity or demanding clarity,
parties have agreed to abide by these general principles of international
environmental law by signing agreements such as the Rio Declaration
and the UNFCCC. Ultimately, successful global action will depend upon
nations' successes in reaching definitional agreement rather than in
crafting theoretical justifications for continued inaction.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The world should directly address the weaknesses and problems
involved in a collective response to climate change to better respond to
the threat. As this article has discussed, economic interests of industry
and individual citizens interfere with achieving an adequate collective
response to climate change. Additionally, climate change parties must
deal with perceived or actual uncertainties in climate change science and
economic impacts. Threat assessments may or may not be accurate and
parties hesitate to act due to a perception that the climate change threat
assessment is inadequate. Distribution, timing, and magnitude of climate
change impacts are uncertain, and states may not experience the benefits
of their emission reductions until some time in the distant future, if at all.
Further complicating public support for agreement, climate change
impacts are not readily apparent. Despite sporadic, catastrophic weather
incidents such as Hurricane Katrina, climate change impacts remain
virtually invisible to the public. In the climate change context, the hope
of better technology gives parties a reason to delay collective action
because it provides the promise of a more accurate threat assessment,
possible solutions, and the opportunity to adapt to the threat. It is clear
that some uncertainties and discrepancies will remain inherent in the
global climate change debate. Regardless, their status as obstacles must
be understood and overcome if agreement is to be achieved.
A. Parties Must Agree Urgency Requires Collective Action
The public is victim to special interests who highlight uncertainties
and difficult-to-understand science in order to delay collective action.
Disagreement regarding how and when to respond to the threat of global
climate change permeates the writings on this global issue.20 6 Critics
206. Joseph E. Aldy et. al., Climate Change: An Agenda for Global Collective
Action (prepared for the conference on "The Timing of Climate Change Policies"), Pew
Center on Global Climate Change (Oct. 2001).
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assert that appropriate emissions levels necessary to stabilize
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs and avert adverse impacts to
economies and ecosystems are unknown.2 °7 Some parties, such as the
United States, argue that emissions abatement without a commitment
from all major-emitters is an inadequate response. Industry and some
business NGOs contend that a response is not yet necessary because
parties do not agree on climate change effects, timing, or magnitude and
that future technological improvements represent a reason to delay
action.
To overcome these obstacles, world political leaders should admit
an urgent response is required and move to respond. As a first step, the
United States, the world's leading emitting nation, could admit that
climate change is a global, transboundary issue requiring an urgent
response. The President could send this message with an executive order
describing the issue as urgent rather than fraught with uncertainties. With
a definitive role model, other major-emitting nations that are not
currently obligated under the Protocol-namely, China and India-may
be enticed to follow the United States' lead. Collective action that
includes the pivotal parties could result.
B. Improve Information by Requiring Data from Major-Emitting
Nations
Parties should also obtain additional and more accurate information
to encourage the consensus process. As previously discussed, China and
India are not subject to the Protocol's provisions requiring National
Greenhouse Gas Inventories. Therefore, they need not submit data
concerning annual emissions and sink removal. Instead, non-Annex I
countries are merely required to provide national communications
describing how they are complying with the Convention and Protocol
goals. This lack of data leaves significant gaps in the overall
understanding of the climate problem. Without this data the assessment
of the threat is incomplete and concerned parties may be unable to make
a vivid enough case for action. This global, transboundary issue requires
as much accurate data as possible. As a result, all parties should be
required to provide this much-needed information so that the group may
better assess emissions limitations. Parties will be better equipped to
collectively develop an appropriate mitigation or abatement response
with appropriate data, and the act of providing such data alone may cause
207. Jacoby et al., supra note 112, at 3.
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reflection and an opportunity for major-emitters to reexamine their
domestic policies.
C. Changing Incentives to Play
Climate change involves a long-term problem for individuals and
their governments, while action involves individuals who must commit
and possibly sacrifice potential gains. Any global climate change
response requires specific individuals to change their behaviors. 20 8 To
induce changed behavior, individual actors must be provided with
incentives to play-to take part in emissions reduction efforts. Incurring
individual costs now for future benefit involves choosing to relinquish
individual gains for the greater societal good. Individuals must be willing
to invest in an insurance policy-in the form of a response-that hedges
uncertain risks and impacts that may occur sometime in the future 20 9 and
may not affect them at all. An impetus for action may arise where people
feel a responsibility or "owe it their children" to act now for the benefit
of future generations.2 10 Individuals should realize their power as
consumers and constituents and their corresponding ability to influence
industry and governments to act and initiate change. Individuals must act
to respond to climate change at the micro level in addition to any macro
efforts by national governments. To promote micro, grassroots level
change, individual actors must be provided with incentives to take part in
emissions reduction efforts. Providing economic incentives to individual
consumers is vital. One possibility is subsidizing or granting tax credits
for the use or development of green energy. It is well established that if
green energy options become cheaper than "dirty energy derived from
fossil fuels," worldwide reductions in emissions are more likely to
occur. 
211
By giving end consumers direct incentives to play, governments can
influence fossil fuel burning corporations to act. Opposition from
businesses remains a major obstacle to climate change collective action.
Under proposed emissions reduction schemes, corporations fear a loss of
economic competitiveness and may have the perception that confronting
and combating climate change may adversely impact industry growth
and profits. To achieve a consensus among industry, gain the support of
developing countries, and end the use of science and economic computer
208. Cooper, supra note 116, at 66.
209. Petersen interview, supra note 114.
210. Id.
211. John C. Topping, Jr., New Approach for Greenhouse Talks, CHEMICAL &
ENGINEERING NEws 22-26 (Sept. 22, 1997).
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modeling problems as excuses for inaction, the collective power of
individual constituents may be tapped to move markets, industry, and
nations. If individual consumers are motivated to demand corporate
action and vote with their feet or otherwise boycott polluters,
corporations may have no choice but to take measures to reduce
emissions.212
If consumers choose less expensive or cost-effective "green"
alternatives (e.g., hybrid cars), then industry will be encouraged to
increase technological advancements and produce new items for
consumers to meet changed market demands.213 An impediment to green
alternatives may be the perceived inconvenience for both industry and
individuals because adapting to reduced emissions may represent a
significant change in lifestyle or business practices. Industry will likely
incur capital costs to develop new lowemissions products, vary
production methods, or convert infrastructure to meet changed consumer
demand. Industry hesitates to act because growth, productivity,
competitiveness, and shareholder assets may be adversely impacted if
companies modify how they do business in advance of changing
consumer demands. It remains uncertain whether consumers will broadly
choose to incur an increased price for green products. Only a critical
mass of consumers choosing green companies will nudge the business
sector to change and in doing so, reduce emissions. In theory, it is clear
that the micro level can move the macro level with consumer pressure.
214
Conversely, the macro level can also move the micro level. Strong
political leadership can generate grassroots interest and support for
cultural change. Persuasive, popular politicians supporting action can
lead by example and convince the public that they have a moral
obligation to sacrifice now for future generations. In any event, a
response to climate change requires the leading emitter, the United
States, to set an example in responding. Foreign citizens may be
persuaded to support collective action and incur individual costs if a
powerful, persuasive global power leads the charge to combat climate
change. Public sentiment is malleable and subject to suggestion and
direction by global leaders. History supports this notion and strong
American presidents have successfully persuaded Congress and the
public to resolve other global, transboundary issues.
215
212. See RUDIGER DORNBUSCH & STANLEY FISCHER. MACROECONOMICS 4 (4th ed.
1987) (describing the impact of microeconomic markets on macroeconomic markets).
213. Topping, supra note 211.
214. See DORNBUSCH, supra note 212.
215. For example, the parties working to resolve the problem of nuclear arms had
the benefit of individual political leaders in the forefront driving global consensus. They
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D. Focus Objectives and Limit the Scope of the Threat
A global, collective response may best be accomplished in stages by
limiting the number of parties at the table and limiting the parameters of
the negotiations by addressing workable issues or pieces of the threat.
Rather than developing a response which addresses overall emissions
allocation, the parties should address smaller issues. As John Topping,
President of the Climate Institute suggests, climate change parties may
want to address different industry sectors that produce significant
emissions. For example, key players could first seek agreements limited
to the transportation sector and vehicle emissions, while other players
216
could negotiate agreements regarding the energy sector. 6 These eclectic
party discussions could provide an opportunity to focus on segmented
issues and create a forum where the necessary expertise of the parties
most at risk could address individual emission sources and custom tailor
solutions. This approach is likely to be more successful in reaching
agreement because smaller groups, addressing a limited threat, generally
have a more focused agenda with fewer individual priorities.
E. Addressing Background Factors
To overcome the uncertainties of climate change science and the
economics involved, the world, and perhaps most notably the United
States, must first admit a response cannot wait. Uncertainty causes a
failure to achieve a universal, coherent public policy agenda. As Richard
Benedick pointed out when assessing the Montreal Protocol, the world
must take "internationally coordinated actions based on realistic and
responsible assessments of risk., 217 A collaboration of scientists and
government officials is essential, as well as the public dissemination of
scientific findings in understandable terms.2z 8  Simply stated,
international parties must accept the fact that climate change is a problem
for all of humanity and will remain so for the foreseeable future.
had the advantage and influence of presidential leaders at the helm of the negotiations.
See GEORGE BuNN, ARMS CONTROL BY COMMITrEE: MANAGING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
RussiANs 7 (1992). With nuclear arms control, powerful leaders guided global action
which culminated in the Reykjavik Summit in 1986, "the true watershed of modem arms
control" when the Soviet Union General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President
Reagan essentially negotiated to end the Cold War. THOMAS GRAHAM, JR. DISARMAMENT
SKETCHES: THREE DECADES OF ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 124 (2002).
216. Topping, supra note 211.
217. BENEDICK, supra note 180, at 2.
218. Id.
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The parties can overcome an incomplete threat assessment by
dividing the threat, or scoping it, into manageable sub-issues. Major-
emitting nations, both developed and developing, must take the lead to
generate an adequate response. Without the major players willing to
commit to emissions limitations, the response will not adequately address
the transboundary threat of climate change. If the most powerful major-
emitting nations-the United States, Russia, and China-lead the way in
admitting an urgent response is necessary, other countries are likely to
follow. If major-emitter leadership emerges, countries such as Canada
and Australia will no longer worry about economic advantages that non-
participants enjoy as a result of uncapped domestic emissions.
F. Use Dynamic Obligations to Overcome Uncertainty
With fewer nations participating and more major-emitting parties at
the negotiating table addressing focused objectives and limited sub-
issues to the overall threat, the world can better attack the bigger threat of
climate change. Additionally, climate change parties should develop
agreements that include flexible obligations. For example, nuclear arms
control agreements-another global, transboundary issue requiring
collective action-included dynamic international obligations or
evolving commitments that adapted to uncertain or unpredictable
circumstances, such as scientific, economic, or technological changes.
19
Climate change agreements should be similarly flexible. Parties
could structure obligation provisions that authorize consensual changes.
To overcome party fears of being locked into unattainable obligations,
agreements could require parties to reassess emissions limitations or
other obligations after IPCC scientific assessments are published.
Specific provisions could allow parties to request a review of their
obligations based on a scientific or economic climate change report.
Dynamic provisions could also ease a party's perception and
concerns regarding economic or scientific uncertainty. Parties could
commit to an agreement, but maintain an opportunity to subsequently
revisit their obligations, commitments, or limitations based upon
changing information or conditions. As science develops to modify
previous predictions of climate change impacts, establish a better threat
assessment, provide a clearer understanding of complex environmental
interactions, or enable innovative technologically solutions, parties could
revisit the obligation provisions. As a result of a flexible mechanism,
219. Edwin M. Smith, Understanding Dynamic Obligations: Arms Control
Agreements, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1549 (1991).
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parties may better perceive gains from cooperation and collective action
if agreements account for emerging knowledge on threat magnitudes,
risk levels, and appropriate strategies. 220 Additionally, developing
country status should be reviewed annually to determine whether
emissions have reached a threshold and require a nation to be within the
obligatory provisions of the agreement.
G. Pivotal Parties, Piecemeal Responses
Climate change collective action depends on bilateral and
multilateral international negotiation and agreement. International
cooperation depends on: 1) voluntary cooperation between parties to
freely join or withdraw from cooperative arrangements, 2) specification
of a common goal or compatible goals on which to focus joint efforts,
and 3) commitment by states to engage with each other on a long-term
basis.
22 1
Instead of seeking global agreement, parties could develop limited
responses-in some cases regional agreements-to address the most
polluting industry sectors or build on earlier party discussions. Parties
could then establish legally-binding consequences for noncompliance.
Since global negotiation efforts, with over 180 participants, have so far
failed to reduce global emissions, a new approach is warranted. First,
several pivotal emitters must be identified and included, since "[f]or the
purpose of fashioning a response to global environmental issues, certain
countries are unequivocally more important than others. 222 Specifically:
no solution to the problem of climate change can be achieved...
without the cooperation of China and India. Because the growth in
emissions rather than the current level of [GHGs] will likely spur
climatic changes, the policy challenge can be viewed as a matter of
controlling emissions from the developing world where most of the
growth is occurring.
223
220. See id. at 1557.
221. PETER VAN HAM, MANAGING NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES IN THE 1990S:
POWER, POLITICS AND POLICIES 34 (1994).
222. Daniel C. Esty, Pivotal States and the Environment, in THE PIVOTAL STATES: A
NEW FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. POLICY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 290, 304 (Robert Chase
et al. eds., 1999).
223. Id. The status of "pivotal" or necessary depends on demographic heft, special
resource endowments, or rogue behavior adversely affecting the environment. Id. at 306.
One example of a special resource endowment is the Brazilian rain forests either because
it acts as a sink for carbon dioxide or source of emissions due to deforestation. Id.
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Secondly, to overcome the drawbacks of divergent national views
and agendas, climate change parties should decrease the negotiating
group size. The overwhelming amount of players should be pared to
pivotal nations to reduce free-rider and other equity issues. The parties
must understand that just because emissions cross national borders and
have global, transboundary effects, not all nations need to be at the
negotiating table. By transitioning from near universal participation to
include only major-emitters and those with special resource issues-for
example Brazil and its massive Amazonian carbon sink-the world may
eliminate numerous national agendas and many of the free-rider
complaints. As part of the new paradigm, major-emitters should
participate regardless of whether they are developing nations. Pivotal
players should be limited to the top seven emitters-the United States,
China, Russia, India, Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
Negotiating groups should also include the leaders of corporate and
financial sectors that contribute to or will be significantly affected by the
climate change threat. 22 4 To resolve sub-issues, the initial discussions of
the smaller groups should strive to include diverse experts with various
skill sets and varying levels of influence. For example, major-emitting
nations, nations leading the car industry, and corporate and financial
leaders could meet to address the "transportation sector" of the climate
change threat.225 Therefore, any sub-issue group would be limited to
pivotal states plus pivotal non-governmental stakeholders. Once sub-
issues are resolved, the major-emitters could develop formal agreements
setting forth legally-binding obligations.
H. Piecemeal Responses, Linear Approach
Once the parties develop negotiation parameters and identify
manageable climate change sub-issues, they should also respond using
agreements that build on the provisions of previous agreements.
Discussions often lead to sequential or linear agreements, with earlier
treaties including provisions to address and enable subsequent
agreements along the same vein. With ongoing dialogue, piecemeal
goals, and focused objectives, sequential agreements may establish
guidelines and groundwork for future agreements.
Sequential agreements also allow parties to augment and strengthen
established regimes, commitments, and overall goals over time.
Although the Convention and Kyoto Protocol did fall in sequence, the




overall regime is comprised of broad principles and emissions capping,
rather than addressing smaller issues or sectors as a means of chipping
away at the climate change problem. As a general rule, if a threat proves
too overwhelming and involves too many controversial issues for global
action, parties should consider using several related agreements to fulfill
goals. Each discussion should build on the previous ones, and the
consensus process will improve the likelihood of success for agreements
that follow.
226
I Develop Regional Agreements
The sequential agreement approach to a global threat may prove
successful because bilateral agreements can lead to comprehensive
achievements. As discussed, limiting participants and focusing on
specific, smaller objectives at the negotiation table encourages
cooperation. Regional agreements with climate change parties can
address more limited goals and sub-issues of the threat. The parties at the
climate change negotiating table could develop greater incentives to
cooperate by responding to limited issues with regional agreements.
They could better use trade and economic bargaining approaches,
especially with the transportation sector, and better promote the
effectiveness of treaties, while simultaneously addressing the sub-issues
of climate change.
In the area of global climate change, the Kyoto Protocol reflects
large-scale global action and participation. This methodology supports
the assertion that climate change is a "second generation" environmental
problem that the international community recognized in the 1980s, and
would best be resolved by concentrated, international action with
227
multilateral treaties. Similarly, the United States supports a "bilateral
226. Nuclear arms control agreements such as the SALT and Treaty on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) reflect a "linear"
approach, containing "look-ahead" provisions addressing the parties' future iterations or
future forms of the same agreement. John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties:
A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J.
139, 224 (1996). For example, the Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms (SALT I),
Article VII, states that the obligations "shall not prejudice the scope or terms of the
limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further
negotiations." Id. at 225.
227. Andronico 0. Adede, Statement, The 'Rio" Environmental Treaties
Colloquium: The Treaty System from Stockholm (1972) to Rio de Janeiro (1992), 13
PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 33, 34 (1995). In this statement, the Deputy Director, Codification
Division, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, indicates that since the Stockholm
Conference a "new breed" of treaties (dealing with "second generation" environmental
problems) has developed that "is strongly influenced by sustainable development." Id. at
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response" as the better framework and strategy. 228
To maximize the chances of reducing global GHG levels, climate
change parties should develop regional agreements regarding the
building of major-emitting industrial plants. Under this scheme, regional
parties could provide input and be put on notice about projected
emissions due to industry growth. Nations in a region would be in a
strategic position to encourage their neighbors to limit their emissions.
Countries in the same geographic region or along a common coastal zone
will tend to face similar risks and impacts and could encourage each
other to reduce or limit emissions. In some cases, unratified agreements
may even be successful in promoting change. 229 For example, in 2005,
the "coal pact" countries, including the United States, China, Australia,
Japan, India, and South Korea, through the Asia Pacific Partnership on
Clean Development and Climate, agreed to promote technologies to
reduce carbon dioxide emissions in coal and implement cleaner
burning.230
VI. CONCLUSION
Although agreements to address global commons dilemmas seem to
call for "global" party participation and demand multilateral agreements,
"pivotal" state agreements 23' may suffice to resolve some global
38 (footnote omitted) (citing to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, calling
for sustainable development, as an example). Id. at 38-39. See also discussion supra Part
IV (discussing these international environmental collective action principles).
228. The Bush Administration supports a strategy of developing "partnerships for
climate solutions," reflecting a piecemeal, bilateral response to global climate change.
WHITE HOUSE CLIMATE CHANGE INITIAL REPORT, supra note 44, at Tab 5.
229. For example with nuclear arms global collective action agreements, when the
parties did not formally establish agreements, participants used those agreements to guide
behavior. Nuclear arms control parties fulfilled the requirements of unratified agreements
such as Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II. Despite the 1980 Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the Senate's suspension of considering the SALT II agreements, and the
successor Reagan Administration modernizing nuclear defenses, President Reagan still
ensured the United States did not deploy troops exceeding SALT II limits, as long as the
Soviets did so as well. Congressional Subcommittee on Arms Control, International
Security & Science of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Fundamentals of Nuclear Arms
Control. Part I: Nuclear Arms Control: A Brief Historical Survey. XXIII (May 20, 1985);
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY. ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS: TEXTS AND HISTORIES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 29 (1996).
230. WHITE HOUSE CLIMATE CHANGE INITIAL REPORT, supra note 44, at Tab 5.
231. See Esty, supra note 222, at 290-314, 304-06 (asserting that in creating global
environmental issue responses certain countries or "pivotal" states "are unequivocally
more important than others" depending on demographic heft, resource endowments, or
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problems. Key participants may prove more important than global
inclusion to achieve a successful international environmental agreement
due to their unique demographics, resources, or past rogue behaviors.23 2
Moreover, all global emitters are unnecessary in order for a
multilateral agreement to adequately respond to climate change. Fewer
negotiating parties mean fewer individual party agendas and a less
tumultuous consensus process. If necessary parties participate and
commit to obligations, fewer free-rider concerns are likely to arise and
prevent agreement. Fewer participants involved in agreements also lead
to greater incentives to cooperate because of fewer tangential
disagreements. Bilateral and/or regional agreements have been shown to
lead to comprehensive achievements. Parties may use regional
agreements to address a global commons problem and in doing so may
successfully achieve limited goals and resolve sub-issues of a global
threat. Although it may initially appear that global problems require
global participation, this approach may not be the most efficient and
productive choice. Too many players often lead to too many agendas,
interests, and priorities. Going forward, parties should consider limiting
the agreement structure to multilateral agreements with pivotal states.
Matters affecting global commons problems such as background
factors, group elements, and ambiguous international environmental
principles should be anticipated and addressed. Parties should attempt to
resolve these issues in drafting a global collective action response to
climate change that includes pivotal states. In crafting such a response, it
would be useful to: 1) establish agreement among all major-emitting
countries that global climate change, despite some scientific
uncertainties, requires an urgent response, 2) obtain complete data by
requiring information from all major-emitting parties, 3) develop
incentives for consumers and constituents to adhere to national
commitments, 4) craft responses for climate change sub-issues for
sectors like energy and transportation 5) limit the number of parties at the
bargaining table to include only necessary or pivotal parties, and 6)
develop piecemeal responses to resolve climate change sub-issues in
sequential agreements. Adherence to these recommendations may
ultimately assist parties in bringing the necessary participants, including
the largest GHG emitter-the United States-to the table. If citizens and
governments of major-emitting countries agree that an urgent response is
needed, maybe the rest of the world will follow.
rogue behavior).
232. Id.
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